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I. OVERVIEW: THE TITLE VII STATUTE 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit 
discrimination based on sex, among other protected traits. 1 Though oft used as a 
route to litigation, Congress initially did not intend that Title VII become a 
pathway to suit, but rather sought to, "encourage formal conciliation and . . .  
foster voluntary compliance . . . "2 through, "the creation of . . .  [anti-harassment] 
policies and effective grievance mechanisms."3 Many times amended,4 Title VII 
states that employers may not: 
discriminate against any individual with respect to ... compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... sex ... 
or (2) ... limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive an 
I .  H.R. REP. No. 88-9 14 ( 1 964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240 1 ;  Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 
l' .S. 424. 429 ( 197 1) (noted congressional intent to promote parity in employment opportunities). 
2 · Stache v. Int'! Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, 852 F.2d 1 23 1 ,  1 234 (9th Cir. 1988) . 
. l Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 ( 1998). 
4. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1 ,  at 2 ( 1 991), reprinted in 1 99 1 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 550 (reveals that 
( 'ongrcss sought to fortify "protections and remedies" available under Title VII); see also H.R. REP. No. 
92-238. at J (197 1 ), reprinted in 1 972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2 137, 2 1 39 (illuminates that Congress sought to 
equip the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with procedures necessary to counter employ­
ment discrimination). 
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individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex . . . . 5 
617 
The Supreme Court has illuminated that "sex" and the other traits protected by 
Title VII require "modifiers" to place their meaning into context.6 M odifiers for 
the term "sex" have become the basis of multitudinous suits.7 Title VII prevents 
employment discrimination based on gender; the statute does not prevent normal 
differences in the way that individuals of the opposite sex interact with each 
other,8 nor does Title VII prevent discrimination based on "mere personal 
dislike. "9 
With the influx of individuals from diverse origins into the American 
workplace, employment disputes between foreign workers and employers 
concerning allegedly discriminatory behavior remains a distinct possibility. 
Regarding undocumented workers' access to specific Title VII remedies, the 
Ninth Circuit has determined that Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 10 a 
Supreme Court case denying illegal immigrants back pay under the National 
Labor Relations Act, does not necessarily preclude illegal immigrants from 
receiving back pay under Title VII. 1 1 The Ninth Circuit posited that "the 
overriding national policy against discrimination would seem likely to outweigh 
any bar against the payment of back wages to unlawful immigrants in Title VII 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
6. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 601 n.9 (2004) (illuminates the 
difference between the broad definitions of traits that Title Vll protects and the relatively narrow 
definition of age, the trait protected by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
7. See Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) (concerns a female 
seeking protection of black women as a subclass). 
8. See Grimes v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 102 F.3d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(court determines that plaintiff did not meet her burden of proof in showing that defendant employer 
disliked her). 
9. See Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (in a Title VII race 
case, a supervisor's comments illustrative of his dislike of the plaintiff did not demonstrate illicit motive 
in decision to terminate hotel Joss prevention officer). 
JO. 5 35 U.S. 137 (2002) (under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (1986), undocumented workers are not eligible to receive back pay under the National Labor 
Relations Act, 49 Stat. 451 ( 1 935), codified at 29 U.S. C. § 153 (West, WESTLAW t�roug� P.L. 109-2)). 
] I. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1066-67 (Hr�ffman does not pertam to Title VII cases, 
because: 
[f]irst, the NLRA authorizes only certain lim!ted privat� causes of action, while Title VII 
depends principally upon private causes of actton for enforcement ... Second, Congress h�s 
armed Title VII plaintiffs with remedies designed to punish employers who engage m 
unlawful discriminatory acts, and to deter future discrimination both by the de.fendant and 
by all other employers . . . [which is why] Title VII's enforcement regime mc�udes . . 
traditional remedies ... [as well as] full compensatory and punitive damages_
. .. Third, under 
the NLRA [National Labor Relations Act], the NLRB [ National Labor Relauons Board] may 
award backpay [sic] to workers when it has found that an employer has v10lated the _
Act. Under 
Title VII, a federal court decides whether a statutory violation warrants a backpay [sic] award.)
. 
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cases." 12 The Circuit also noted that its decision corresponds with Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission Enforcement Guidelines, which promote 
the "settled principle that undocumented workers are covered by the federal 
employment discrimination statutes."13 At least one circuit has addressed the 
issue of Title VII protections for foreign nationals, holding that a foreign national 
must show authorization to work in the U.S. at the time of the disputed incident to 
receive Title VII protections. 14 
A. EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER DTLE vn 
Title VII requires that employers assume vicarious liability for decision­
makers. 15 However, the circuits differ in determining whether an employer must 
assume liability for the discriminatory actions of individuals who influence 
employment decisions, but do not make such decisions. In a decision by Judge 
Posner. the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff can buttress her Title VII claim 
with the prejudiced actions of an employee who is not normally a decision­
makcr. but who nevertheless influences contended decisions regarding the 
plaintiff. 16 Alternatively, the Third Circuit and Fourth Circuit have held that 
employers can only be liable under Title VII for actions committed by 
decision-makers, not for actions by employees who "merely influence" the 
contested decision. 17 However, the Third and Fourth Circuits do concede that a 
12. Id.at 1069. 
13. Id. at 1070 (quoting from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission); see EQUAL 
E:vtl'I .( IYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Rescission of Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to 
l!11tl11rn111e111ed Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws (June 27, 2003), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc-rescind.html. 
14. See Chaudhry v. Mobil Oil Corp. 186 F.3d 502, 504 (4th Cir. 1999) (complainant lacking 
dornmcntation rendering him qualified to work in the U.S.  not entitled to invoke Title vm. 
I 5. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) ("Congress has directed federal courts 
to interpret Title VII based on [tort] agency principles."). But see Kolstad v. ADA, 527 U.S. 526, 545 
( 1999) (quoting Kolstad v. ADA, 139 F.3d 958, 974 (1998), vacated by 527 U.S. 526, (Tatel, J., 
dissenting) ("f l]n the punitive damages context, an employer may not be vicariously liable for the 
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the 
employer's 'good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII . '")). 
16. See Lust v. Sealy, 383 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 2004) (defendant employee's recommendation to a 
decision-maker that plaintiff be turned down for a promotion caused the plaintiff's injury, and thus 
justified the lower court's finding). The Seventh Circuit did, however, hold that detennining the 
rcasonahlcness of justifications provided by an employer for contested behavior, requires only a 
consideration of the decision-maker's actions. Id.; cf Buie v. Quad/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 503 (7th 
Cir. 2004) ("We evaluate a claim of FMLA retaliation the same way that we would evaluate a claim of 
retaliation under other employment statutes, such as the ADA or Title VII ."); cf Maarouf v. Walker Mfg. 
Co .. 210 F.3d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 2000) (permitting the transfer of an employee's bias to a decision-maker 
for purposes of Title VII suit when the an employee who made derogatory comments regarding plaintiff's 
religion in a Title VII case influenced the decision to terminate plaintiff, a machine operator); accord 
Krchnavy v. Limagrain Genetics Corp., 294 F.3d 871, 876-77 (7th Cir. 2002). 
17. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistic Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 290-91 (opinion on rehearing en 
hanc) (4th Cir. 2004); accord Foster v. New Castle Area Sch. Dist., 98 Fed. Appx. 85 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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decision-maker may not simply 'rubber stamp' other employees' decisions in 
order to protect such employees from liability. 18 
B. SEX DISCRI MINATION UNDER TITLE VII 
1. "Because of Sex" 
Under Title VII, alleged illicit sex discrimination must occur "because of sex" 
to be actionable.19 Though little legislative history is available to illuminate the 
meaning of "sex",20 courts have determined that Title VII's "because of sex" 
clause protects individuals from unfavorable employment terms, conditions, and 
discriminatory acts based on gender.21 The clause protects both men and 
women.22 Determining whether behavior prompting Title VII discrimination 
claims occurs because of sex requires examining the context in which such 
behavior arose, as determined by the "surrounding circumstances, expectations, 
and relationships."23 
The "because of sex" clause does not preclude individuals suffering from sex 
discrimination imposed by members of the same sex from receiving Title VII 
protections.24 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Court 
indicated that Title VII protects individuals who are victims of job-related 
discrimination committed by an individual of the same sex. 25 However, the Court 
revealed that Title VII does not necessarily provide protections for acts merely 
sexual in nature.26 In  Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., which also concerned 
same-sex discrimination, the Ninth Circuit held that Title VII prohibits "severe or 
pervasive same-sex offensive sexual touching," because such harassment consti­
tutes gender-based discrimination.27 
2. Gender Stereotyping 
The High Court in Price v. Waterhouse has ruled that adverse employment 
actions rooted in stereotypical notions of proper comportment based on gender 
1 8. Hill, 354 F.3d 277 at 290-9 1 ;  see also Foster, 98 Fed. Appx. at 88. 
1 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
20. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1 97 1 )  (provides 
commentary regarding the Jack of legislative history construing the meaning of "sex" under Title Vil). 
21 . See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5 1 0  U.S. 17, 25 ( 1 993); see also Willingham v. Macon Telegraph 
Pub I' g Co., 507 F.2d 1 084, 1 091 (5th Cir. 1 975). 
22. See Newport News S hip Bldg v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 ( 1983). 
23. Id. at 682. ("Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and 
juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of .the same _
sex
:, 
and 
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive. ). 
24. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1997). 
25. Id. 
26. See id. at 80-82. 
27. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F .3d 1061, 1 066 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S
. 922 
(2003). 
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violates Title VII.28 However, Title VII prohibitions against gender stereotyping 
do not necessarily preclude arguably pernicious sexual orientation stereotyping. 
Numerous circuits distinguish between discrimination motivated by one's failure 
to conform to stereotypical gender expectations and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, holding that Title VII prohibits the former, but does not pertain 
to the latter. 29 
The recurring stereotype of woman as caregiver has generated numerous 
lawsuits.Jo The Court has warned that perpetuating stereotypes of women as 
primary caregivers results in the persistence of such stereotypes and promotes 
negative depictions of the quality of women employees.3 1 The Second Circuit 
used this supposition to find that an employer's articulations that work and 
motherhood are incompatible constituted gender stereotyping and served as 
evidence that the employer illicitly considered gender in an employment decision 
adverse ly affecting the plaintiff.32 
3. "Sex-Pl us" Other Categories 
Some courts have afforded specific protections to certain gender subclasses, 
among them minority women, women with children, and married women, 
dubbing such classes "sex-plus."33 For a complainant to assert a sex-plus case, 
she must proffer evidence demonstrating that individuals of the opposite sex not 
possessi ng the "sex-plus" trait were treated differently than she or provide a 
"crystal l ized legal theory that . .. [suggests] a viable basis for such a cause of 
28. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, 257 (1989) (plurality opinion) (Court rules 
discriminatory treatment of woman not conforming with employer company's gender expectations 
constituted behavior violating Title VII). 
29. See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); see also 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (court upholds the dismissal of the Title VII 
complaint of a plaintiff allegedly subject to discrimination because of his sexual orientation, because "the 
law is well settled in this circuit and in all others that have reached the question that Title VII does not 
prohibit harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation."). 
10. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); see also Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 126 (2d Cir. 2004). 
11. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736. 
12. See Back, 365 F.3d at 126. 
11. Compare Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980) (in 
providing a remedy specifically for black women, the court reasoned that: 
Ii In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it did not intend to provide protection 
against discrimination directed especially toward black women as a class separate and distinct 
from the class of women and the class of blacks, . . [the court] cannot condone a result which 
leaves black women without a viable Title VII remedy.) 
and Lam v. Univ. of Hawai'i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1162 (9th Cir. 1994), ajf'd in part, rev'd in part on other 
>:rounds, 164 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 1998) (acknowledges that "[l]ike other subclasses under Title VII, 
Asian women are subject to a set of stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by 
white women."); with Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam) (court justifies 
a distinction between women with school-aged children and men with children of the same age if such 
distinction is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."). 
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action.�'34
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However, not all gender subclasses are granted Title VII protections. 
The D1stnct Court for th� Southern District of New York declined to protect a 
subclass even more specific than women with children, declaring that women 
with children who work part time are not a Title VII protected subclass. 35 
The recent surge of cases with both age and sex discrimination allegations has 
spurred some to argue that courts should consider older women to be a protected 
subclass.36 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania allowed a plaintiff's sex-plus 
age claim to withstand judgment, asserting that because age is an "immutable 
characteristic,"37 older women constitute a protected subclass. However, other 
circuit courts have yet to acknowledge the validity of a sex-plus age claim.38 In 
fact, the Sixth Circuit declined to carve out a protected subclass based on sex and 
age, citing the lack of support for such a theory in other circuits.39 
C. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPP ORTUNITY COM MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
and charged the agency with enforcing Title VII.4° Congress initially intended 
that the EEOC facilitate mediation of discrimination disputes based on a 
plaintiff's protected class.41 The EEOC maintains a significant role in Title VIl 
proceedings, because the Commission develops guidelines and issues procedures 
governing claimants.42 When an EEOC-reviewed Title VII claim reaches the 
courts, the EEOC's findings do not bind the courts.43 However, courts usually 
34. See Higgins, 194 F.3d at 261; see also Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1 420, 1446-47 (2d Cir. 
1995) (plaintiff college professor alleging that sex discrimination prevented her from receiving tenure did 
not prevail on her sex-plus marital status claim, because she did not proffer evidence showing that 
married women were treated differently than married men). 
35. See Capruso v. Hartford Finan. Servs., No. 01- 4250, 2003 WL 1872653, *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
36. See Nicole B. Porter, Sex-Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENY. 
U. L. REv. 79, 110 (2003) ("[V]arious literature . . supported the fact that there is not only a problem of 
discrimination against older women, but also that older women are victims of more severe and more 
frequent disparate treatment than older men or younger women.); see also Roberson v. Allte_I Info. Servs., 
373 FJd 647, 649-650 (5th Cir. 2004) (forty-eight year old male programmer alleged that hi s se� and age 
motivated his termination)· Read v. BT Alex Brown, Inc., 72 Fed. Appx. 112, 113 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(plaintiff investment broke; alleged age discrimination under the ADEA and sex discrimination under 
Title VII); Capruso, 2003 WL 1872653 at *5; Tirado Arce v. Ara�ark Corp., 239 F.Supp. 2d I_ 53, 164-6� 
(D.P.R. 2003), (plaintiff food worker brought claims under the Title V II and the ADEA, allegmg age an 
sex discrimination motivated decision to lay the plaintiff off). 
d 
. d 37. See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (D. Pa.  1994) (female plaintiff, who was eme a 
secretarial position, constituted a member of a subclass of women over forty). 
38. P orter, supra note 36, at 85-86. . · · 
39. See Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21086, *14 (6th Cir. 1999) (re1ed
cti
1
ng 
h · · h h Id b otected as an older woman an a so P armaceutical sales representative's content10n that s e s  o� e pr 
rejected the her age discrimination and sex discrimination claims). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) ( West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
41. See Stache, 852 F.2d at 1234. ... d or 4�. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (West, WESTLAW throug� P.L . 10;-�) <i;r?c may issue, amen • 
rescmd suitable procedural regulations to carry out the prov1s1ons of Title ). 
43. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) . 
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I . Process Required When an Alleged Title VII Discrimination Victim Files 
With the Equal Employment Opportunity C ommission 
An employee alleging gender discrimination must exhaust state and local 
administrative remedies before filing Title VII charges with the EEOC.45 If the 
alleged discriminatory practice occurred in a location without a state or local 
agency charged with handling such discriminatory claims, then the claimant must 
file her claim with the EEOC within 180 days of the date when the alleged 
discrimi nation took place.46 If the alleged discrimination occurred in a state that 
has a state or local agency charged with handling such claims, then the claimant 
has 300 days from the date of the alleged illicit acts to file her claim. 47 EEOC 
regulati ons require that a Title VII claimant provide a written statement 
iden ti fying and detailing the allegedly discriminatory acts causing the claimant's 
in jury and specifying why the claimant believes such acts are discriminatory.48 
Though a Title VII plaintiff must exhaust state and local remedies before filing 
with the EEOC, a claimant who files a Title VII charge with a state agency can 
also elect to simultaneously file with the EEOC.49 The EEOC must wait until the 
state agency has ceased actions regarding the named employer before it processes 
a Title VII charge. 50 Such a charge is considered filed with the EEOC "upon the 
expirat ion of 60 (or, where appropriate, 1 20) days after deferral, or upon the 
termi nati on of .. . [the state] agency proceedings, or upon waiver of the . .. 
I state I agency's right to exclusively process the charge, whichever is earliest."51 
After a s tate agency resolves a Title VII dispute, the unsuccessful party can file 
sui t in state court or, after securing a right-to-sue letter, discussed infra, federal 
court .52 
Prior employment agreements between a potential Title VII plaintiff and her 
44. See id. at 65; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). 
45. 42 U. S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (West, WESTLAW through P. L. 109-2). 
46. 42 U.S. C. § 2000-e-5(e)(l )  (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
47. Id.; see generally Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist., 392 F.3d 236, 238 (7th Cir. 2004), (citing Lever 
v. Northwestern Univ., 9 79 F.2d 552, 556 (7th Cir. l 992), for an explanation regarding the application of 
the continuing violation doctrine, which may permit a court to consider acts that occurred before Title VII 
statute of limitations, when the plaintiff gains awareness of the discriminatory nature of the act within the 
limitations periods due to repetition of the act). The continuing violation doctrine does not negate the 
precept that "failure to remedy an unlawful employment action is not a discrete actionable violation." Id. 
48. 29 C.F.R. § 160 l .12(b)-16.0115(b) (West , WESTLAW through 2005); see also McGoffney v. 
Vigo County Div. of Family and Servs., 389 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirms summary judgment in 
employer's favor on plaintiff job applicant's Title VII claim, finding the "vague" language the plaintiff 
used in drafting her EE OC charge "[was] insufficient to place the E OC or the . . .  [defendant employer] 
on notice of the particular job applications to which she was referring."). 
49. See 29 C.F.R. § 160 l .l 3(a) (West, WESTLAW through 2005). 
50. 29 C.F.R. § 160 I. l 3(a) (West. WEST LAW through 2005). 
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(a) (West, WESTLAW through 2005). 
52. Garcia v. Village of Mount Prospect, 360 F.3d 630, 642-43 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Simply because 
federal civil-rights claims must be considered first by . .. [the state agency] ... and the EEOC in the case 
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former employer can also affect her ability to bring Title VII claims. A plaintiff 
submitting her claim for arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement does 
not in and of itself constitute a waiver of the plaintiff's Title VII rights.53 
However, a plaintiff employed by a government agency governed by a collective 
bargaining agreement can either file a Title VII claim or file a grievance 
procedure according to the collective bargaining agreement, but she cannot file 
both.54 Additionally, if a complainant employed by a federal agency finds herself 
the victim of an act that both violates Title VII and can be appealed under the 
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), then she can seek remedy for her 
claims in a "mixed case."55 The complainant can either file a "mixed case 
complaint" with the EEOC office governing her place of employment or file a 
"mixed case appeal" directly with the MSPB."56 A mixed-case plaintiff cannot 
bifurcate her claim by not including either the Title VII claim or MSPB claim in 
her initial action.57 
When an individual files a charge with the EEOC, the EEOC must investigate 
and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the charge.58 In 
investigating the claim's validity, the EEOC may access all relevant material, 
which encompasses "virtually all material that might cast light on the allegations 
against an employer as it collects evidence in investigating a Title VII claim. "59 
The High Court noted that courts tend to liberally construe the statute's use of 
"relevant."60 If the EEOC finds a lack of reasonable cause to believe a 
complainant's charge, then the EEOC must dismiss the charge61 and inform the 
of Title VII claims . . .  does not mean that the circuit court cannot eventually exercise jurisdiction over 
those claims, once the administrative process is completed."). 
53. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) (In explaining that a discrimination 
clause under a collective bargaining agreement could not constitute a waiver of an individual's Title VII 
rights, the Court determined that the validity of a waiver of an individual's Title VII rights would depend 
on whether such waiver was "knowing and voluntary."). 
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.301 (West, WESTLAW through 2005); see also Wright v. Snow, No. 02-7615, 
2004 WL 1907687 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (complainant barred from bringing a charge under Title VII 
concerning her Jack of advancement with her former place of employment, the IRS, because 
complainant's collective bargaining agreement allows the complainant to bring discrimination claims in a 
non-judicial forum). But see Macy v. Dalton, 853 F. Supp. 350, 355 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§ 712I(d) and 29 C.F.R. §1613.219(b), the court relies on the cited authorities in determining that 
federally employed individuals who elect to pursue statutory remedies under Title VII must exhaust 
administrative remedies; similarly plaintiffs who elect a grievance procedure must exhaust such 
grievance procedures before pursuing a statutory remedy). 
55. Valentine-Johnson v. Roche, 386 F.3d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 2004) (a mixed case "employee must 
navigate the administrative regime that governs Title VII as well as the procedures for challenging an 
adverse personnel action under the Civil Service Reform Act."). 
56. Id. (quoting Butler v. West, 164 F.3d 634, 638-39 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
57. See Chappell v. Chao, 388 F.3d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 2004 ). 
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)( l )  (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
59. EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 n.20 ( l  984). 
60. Id. 
61. See id. 
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complainant of its decision to dismiss her charge. 62 
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If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe the plaintiff's charge, then the 
Commission will attempt to conciliate the employment dispute. 63 If the involved 
parties do not resolve the disputed issues during informal conciliation, the EEOC 
may provide the complainant with a right-to-sue letter,64 sue the alleged 
discriminatory employer, 65 intervene in an ongoing suit, 66 or "appear as amicus 
rnrie in a private Title VII action. "67 If the EEOC elects to issue a right-to-sue 
letter to the complainant, the complainant must file a complaint, in a trial court, 
within ninety days of receiving the right-to-sue letter in order to bring a claim.68 
The EEOC can also elect to file suit. 69 C ongress amended Title VII in 1972 to 
enable the EEOC to file suit against employers and ensure that EEOC bore "the 
primary burden of litigation. "70 Although a plaintiff can relinquish her right to 
seek judicial relief under Title VII, 71 such action does not limit the EEOC's 
abil ity to seek victim-specific remedies, 72 though the Supreme Court has held 
that the EEOC cannot pursue relief on behalf of an alleged victim whose case has 
already been adjudicated. 73 Some circuits permit the EEOC to bring suit against 
an employer named in a private Title VII suit upon the private suit's termination 
for other discriminatory practices violating Title VII. 74 Alternatively, the Third 
Circuit has allowed the EEOC to bring a separate suit against a non-governmental 
62. Su id. 
63. Sec 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
64. Su 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I) (West, W ESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) (in situations in which a 
daimant names a state or local government agency as the defendant, the Department of Justice is charged 
with providing the claimant a right-to-sue letter). 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. See, Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481F.2d 501, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("Section 705(h) of Title 
VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g), specifically authorizes EEOC attorneys to represent the Commission as a 
pa11y or as amicus curiae."). 
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2); see also Baldwin County 
Welcome Cen. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (per curiam). 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
70. Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.  318, 325 (1980). 
71. See 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (1994); see also Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, 197 F.3d 752, 760 (5th Cir. 
1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1099 (2000) ("Following the Gilmer reasoning, most of the courts of 
appea!s have concluded that individual Title VII claims can be subjected to compulsory arbitration under 
employees' non-collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate pursuant to the FAA."); cf Gilmer v. 
lnlerstate/Johnson Lane, 895 F.2d 195, 203 (4th Cir. 1990) (regards the relinquishment of Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act rights), aff'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991) ("It is by now clear that statutory 
daims may be the subject of an arbitr ation agreement, enforceable"). 
72 . See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 292 (2002). 
73. See id. al 305 (The Court stated: 
�f � court rejects the merits of a claim in a private lawsuit brought by an employee . . .  res 
JUdicata bars the EEOC from recovering victim-specific relief on behalf of that employee in a 
later action . . .  [Additionally, to] the extent that the EEOC is seeking victim-specific relief in 
court for a particular employee, it is able to obtain no more relief for that employee than the 
employee could recover for himself by bringing his own lawsuit.). 
74. EEOC v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 511 F.2d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 1975) (The court stated: 
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employer on its own behalf at any time, unhampered by preclusion restraints 
imposed by a Title VII plaintiff's prior public suit concerning the same issue.75 
State limitations periods do not constrain the timeframe within which the EEOC 
may bring a Title VII claim.76 
When the EEOC files suit, the Commission does not act as a representative of 
the allegedly wronged party, but instead acts to "vindicate the public interest in 
preventing employment discrimination," because the EEOC seeks to placate 
interests broader than those of any one individual plaintiff.77 Several circuits 
agree that a correct interpretation of Title VII precludes the EEOC from filing suit 
unless the EEOC certifies that it does so in the interest of the public.  78 
The EEOC can also intervene in an ongoing suit.79 Some courts hold that the 
EEOC can intervene in an ongoing Title VII suit, but cannot file suit separately 
once a Title VII plaintiff has filed a complaint in a trial court after receiving a 
right-to sue letter.80 In addition, the EEOC can also appear as amicus curiae in an 
individual's Title VII case.81 
2. Issues Regarding Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Procedural 
Steps 
Although the Circuits differ in their treatment regarding the necessity of 
various EEOC requirements pertaining to Title VII claims, many courts have held 
that the EEOC must have taken at least one procedural step, as a condition 
precedent to suit subject to waiver. Courts have focused particularly two initial 
steps-filing a charge and receiving a right-to-sue letter. The Supreme Court 
Congress meant to avoid duplicative proceedings by limiting the EEOC to perm1ss1ve 
intervention when the EEOC raises no substantially different issues and seeks no relief other 
than for the private party. An entirely different situation exists when the EEOC uses the filing of 
a charge simply as a jurisdictional springboard to investigate whether the employer is engaged 
in any discriminatory practices; this investigation might frequently disclose, as in this instance, 
illegal practices other than those listed in the charge.); 
accord EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1357 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 
(1975). 
75. EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664, 667-72 (3d Cir. 1976). 
76. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367-70 (imposing state statute of limitations on 
the EEOC would unjustly undermine Congressional intent to enable EEOC to investigate and conciliate 
claims, in light of the EEOC's expansive responsibilities). 
77. Id. at 326; see also Wafftehouse, Inc., 534 U.S. at 287. 
78. See EEOC v. Cont'l Oil Co., 548 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1977); see also EEOC v. Harris Chemin, 10 
F.3d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 2002); Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d at 1363 n.15 (6th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. 
Missouri Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1974). 
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l )  (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) ("Upon timely application, 
the court may, in its discretion, permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a 
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon 
certification that the case is of general importance."). 
80. See, e.g., EEOC v. Harris Cherin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1993) (court sought to prevent 
the EEOC from simultaneously bringing suit based on the same action as that of the Title VII plaintiff's 
private suit). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4f (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
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declared that filing a charge with the EEOC is a step subject to "waiver, estoppel, 
and equitable tolling."82 Equitable tolling provides protections for minor 
claimants who have not filed a complaint until the young claimants reach legal 
age and for claimants who have not filed a complaint when they are not in the 
jurisdiction of the alleged discrimination .83 Many circuits have held that receipt 
of a right-to-sue letter is "a precondition [of suit] subject to waiver, estoppel, and 
equitable tolling."84 A plethora of rationales underlie this widely-held holding. 
Some courts herald the sensibility of applying the Supreme Court's holding in 
Zipes, "that the timely filing of an EEOC charge is not jurisdictional," to hold to 
all Title VII requirements listed in 2000e-5(f)( l ), are "nonjurisdictional . . .  [and] 
thus subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling."85 Other courts reason that 
"because a timely filing with the EEOC necessarily precedes the return of a 
right-to-sue [ letter] from the EEOC, such [a letter] must also be [a condition 
precedent that is] curable. "86 The sheer force of precedent from persuasive courts 
also serves as a motivating factor in treating a right-to-sue letter as a condition 
precedent to suit.87 
Concerning other EEOC requirements, the Eleventh Circuit has declared that 
the proper naming of a party in an EEOC charge and right-to-sue letter, the 
timeliness of the EEOC charge, and whether an EEOC charge filed by one party 
can be used by the non-filing plaintiffs, are all condition precedents subject to 
estoppel .88 Later, the circuit expanded its already expansive view by stating that 
"all Title VII  procedural requirements to suit are henceforth to be viewed as 
conditions precedent to suit rather than as j urisdictional requirements."89 On 
behalf of the Second Circuit, Judge Calebresi has noted that "when . . .  decisions 
have turned on the question of whether proper administrative exhaustion is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite rather than a waivable condition precedent to bringing 
suit, . . . [the court has] consistently chosen the latter approach."90 
82. Zipes v. Trans World A irlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 ( 1 982). 
83. Young v. U.S., 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002). 
84. Rivers v. Barberton Bd. of Educ., 143 F.3d 1029, 1031 (6th Cir. 1 998) ("[I]t appears that the time 
might now be r ight to join our sister circuits that have already concluded that a right-to-sue letter is 
merely a condition precedent, and not a jurisdictional requirement, to bringing a Title VII action."); see 
also F orehand v. Florida State Hosp., 89 F.3d 1562, 1 5 6 7-69 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 996) (court notes that a plaintiff 
should be free to make an early request for a r ight-to-sue letter upon the assumption that the EEOC will 
perform as contemplated in the regulations by issuing the letter only if it is probable that it will be unable 
to complete the administrative processing within the 1 80 day time limitation); McKinnon v. Kwong Wash 
Rest.. 83 F.3d 498, 505 ( 1st Cir. 1 996); Puckett v. Tenn. Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 148 1 ,  1487 (6th Cir. 
1989): Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, 678 F.2d 1 2 1 1 ,  1 2 1 7  (5th Cir. 1 982) (per curiarn) ("[T]he receipt of a  
right-to-sue letter . . .  is a condition precedent subject t o  equitable modification."). 
85. See, e.g., McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Rest., 83 F.3d 498, 505 ( 1 st Cir. 1 996). 
86. Jones v. Am. State Bank, 857 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1 988), cited in Rivers, 143 F.3d at 1032. 
87. See Rivers, 1 43 F.3d at 1032. 
88. Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R . R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1 005-08 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 982). 
89. Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 7 1 3  F.2d 1 5 18, 1 525 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1983). 
90. Francis v. City of N.Y., 235 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Butts v. N.Y. Dep't of Hous. 
Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1 397, 1 40 1  (2d Cir. 1 993) (The court stated: 
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�itle YII plaintiffs may
. 
als� take mea�u�es to prevent courts from declaring 
therr chums barred by res 1udzcata. A plamt1ff seeking to bring a Title VII claim 
rooted in actions buttressing a suit already brought by the p laintiff, can decrease 
the likelihood of res judicata rendering her Title VII claim futile. Such a plaintiff 
may request that the court handling her initial claim stay the proceedings and/or 
amend her initial complaint.91 
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Concerns 
Though the High Court has prohibited practices preventing potential Title VII 
plaintiffs from redressing their claims, a plaintiff can relinquish or trust away her 
Title VII rights.92 Courts emphasize that a plaintiff must file suit within a timely 
manner, and they refuse to excuse plaintiffs from the ninety day statute of 
limitations for filing suit.93 The Seventh Circuit determined that a plaintiff can 
also lose her rights to resort to Title VII because of imprudent legal advice.94 
Additionally, if a plaintiff delays in filing her claim, the laches doctrine, which 
prevents potential Title VII plaintiffs from pursuing proceedings against employ­
ers inordinately long after the alleged discriminatory incidents occurred,95 may 
Of course, it remains the case that exhaustion of administrative remedies through the EEOC 
stands as 'an essential element of Title VII's statutory scheme, '  . . .  and one with which 
defendants are entitled to insist that plaintiffs comply. Here, however, defendants neither 
alleged in their answer any failure to exhaust administrative remedies nor raised any problems 
with exhaustion until after judgment had been entered.).  
91 .  Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 383 F.3d 309, 3 1 5  (5th Cir. 2004) (citing cases from an array of 
circuits, including the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits, in which the 
presiding court barred plaintiff(s)  from bringing a Title VII claim when the plaintiffs "failed to take 
measures to avoid preclusion under res judicata while they pursued the requisite Title VII remedies"). 
92. But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denner Co., 4 1 5  U.S. 36, 52 ( 1 974 ); Riley v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. 
Co., 881 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir. J 989) (court refused to examine the subjective intent of a plaintif� who 
waived her Title VII rights due to her lawyer's advice, holding that examining plaintiff's subjective mtent 
would obstruct Title VII's purpose-settlement). . 
93. See, e.g., Williams v. Thomson Corp., 383 F.3d 789, 79 1 (8th Cir. 2004) (per cunam) (beca�s� t�e 
right-to-sue letter arrived at the most recent address plaintiff provided to the EEOC, plamttff s 
explanation that she moved will not prevent dismissal of plaintiff's claims, for plaintiff failed to fulfill her 
duty to infonn EEOC of her address change). But see Everson v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 2 1 6  F. Supp. 2d 
71 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).  . d 94. See Riley 88 1 F.2d at 374 ("The fact that plaintiff's counsel may have maccuratel y  �onveye the 
effect of the rel�ase or failed to draft language adequate to protect plaintiff's Title VII_ 
n�hts n_iay . 
be 
· 
· · h · d
. 
· 1 · t rpretau· on of plainttff s subjective remedied through a malpractice action, but not throug JU 1cta m e 
intent."). 
95. Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. IO I ,  1 2 1  (2002) (The Court stated: 
[ h . h b 1 · tt"ff from maintaining a suit if he A]n employer may raise a !aches defense, w ic ars a P am 
unreasonably delays i n  filin g  a suit and as a result harms the defendant · · · [A �aches defen�J 'requires proof of ( ! )  lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense 1s asserted, a 
(2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense. '  
(quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 5 1 4  U.S.  673, 687 ( 1 995) (quoting Costello v .  United States, 365 U.S
.  265, 
282 (1961))). 
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preclude the plaintiff from filing her claim.96 The Eighth Circuit distinguished 
between situations out of the plaintiff's control causing plaintiff to miss the 
statute of limitations for filing suit, and situations in which a court dismisses 
plaintiff's claim because of plaintiff's failure to adhere to administrative 
procedures, holding that equitable tolling provides refuge only for plaintiffs in 
the former situation.97 
A Title VII plaintiff can also waive her right to bring a Title VII action under a 
voluntary settlement.98 However, the circuits utilize different approaches in 
determining the validity of such waivers. The Second and Third Circuits consider 
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a plaintiff signed a 
contract relinquishing Title VII rights "knowingly and voluntarily."99 Alterna­
tively, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits refuse to consider a waiving party's 
subjective intent absent fraud or duress; both courts seek to maintain the 
96. See Smith v. Caterpillar, 338 F.3d 730, 734-735 (7th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court's ruling 
that the laches doctrine barred plaintiff's Title VII claim when the plaintiff initially pursued her Title VII 
l·lairn with a stale agency charged with handling such claims and then commenced proceedings with the 
EEOC' nearly seven years later at the earliest. The court determined that "[t]he longer the plaintiff delays 
in fi l ing her claim, the less prejudice the defendant must show in order to defend laches."). Compare 
Hrown v. Kansas Cty. Power & Light Co., 267 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 200 1) (affirms district court's 
holding that plaintiff's Title VII suit was barred by )aches, because plaintiff, who brought suit more than 
six years after she filed EEOC charges, delayed in bringing suit, and the district court did not abuse its 
dis<.:rclion i n  determining that such delay "was neither reasonable nor excusable,"), with Davis v. 
P;rnasonic Co. USA, No. 02- 143 1 ,  2002 WL 3 1 4 15726 (N.D. III. 2002) (the court determined that the 
n i ncly-day time limitation did not toll, because neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiff's attorney received 
the requ i site right-to-sue letter, and the plaintiff would have timely filed suit if plaintiff had received the 
right-to-sue letter). 
97. Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1 262, 1 266 (8th Cir. 1990). 
98. See Alexander, 4 1 5  U.S. at 52. 
99. See Bormann v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting EEOC v. 
Am. Express Publ 'g Corp. ,  68 1 F. Supp. 216, 2 19  (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (factors useful in deciding whether a 
release of Title VII Rights include: 
I )  the plaintiff's education and business experience, 2) the amount of time the plaintiff had 
possession of or access to the agreement before signing it, 3) the role of plaintiff in deciding the 
terms of the agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) whether the plaintiff was represented 
by or consulted with an attorney, and 6) whether the consideration given in exchange for the 
waiver exceeds employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or 
law' . . .  [and] whether an employer encourages or discourages an employee to consult an 
attorney.)); 
cf Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 5 14, 522 (3d Cir. 1988) (court applies a Title VII analysis in an 
ADEA case, and avers that: 
Ii In Title VII cases, the determination of whether a waiver has been 'knowingly and willfully' 
made has been predicated upon an evaluation of several indicia arising from the circumstances 
and conditions under which the release was executed . . . .  In light of the strong policy concerns 
to eradicate discrimination in employment, a review of the totality of the circumstances, 
considerate of the particular individual who has executed the release, is also necessary.). 
But see Alexander, 415  U.S. at 52 (a court would have to assess whether a waiver was voluntary and 
knowing; the Court did not determine whether a court making such a determination would consider 
subjective factors). 
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contract's sanctity. 100 In emphasizing a plaintiff's adherence to procedural 
requirements and allowing plaintiffs to voluntarily waive their Title VII rights, 
courts do not wish to divest plaintiffs of those protections. 
Significant litigation has arisen from businesses' efforts to reduce liability in 
Title VII discrimination cases. 101 Cognizance of successor liability cases, in 
which a defendant employer transfers ownership and the new owner objects to 
the potential liability incurred, 102 and integrated enterprise cases, which involve 
"separate entities [that] constitute . . .  a single employer," 1 03 may prove particu­
larly relevant in today's merger-laden business atmosphere. Plaintiffs filing Title 
VII claims often do not participate in negotiations motivating such transfers of 
employer ownership, and accordingly are disadvantaged when such transfers 
occur. 104 Several circuits have upheld the successor liability doctrine with respect 
to employment discrimination cases, albeit with different approaches. The Ninth 
Circuit has outlined a three-factor test for determining successor liability 
applicability when an employer's assets are transferred, a test also used by the 
Third Circuit. 105 Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit has carved out a different 
LOO. See Pilon v. Univ. of Minnesota, 7 10 F.2d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1 983). A plaintiff graduate student's 
settlement agreement to waive her Title VII rights constituted an adequate release; thus the court refused 
to inquire into the plaintiff's subjective intent, because the plaintiff had legal representation throughout 
the process and signed a negotiation agreement; accordingly, there was no evidence of fraud or duress. 
Plaintiff's waiver of Title VII rights applied, because plaintiff's attorney negotiated the unambiguous 
waiver. See id. ; see also Fortino v. Quasar Co., 950 F.2d 389, 394 (7th Cir. 1991)  (court dismissed 
plaintiff's Title VII claim, though the plaintiff business executive admittedly did not understand terms of 
a waiver of his Title VII rights and the plaintiff's legal "representation was indirect and the release was 
not negotiated." The court did not want to subjugate Title VII's settlement goals by allowing the plaintiff 
to avoid unfavorable results of his agreed upon settlement.). 
101.  See Morelli v. Cede!, 14 1 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1998) (U.S. branches of foreign businesses can be 
held liable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act). 
102. See Brzozowski v. Corr. Physician Servs., 360 F.3d 1 73, 1 80-81 (3d Cir. 2004) (Title VII plaintiff 
was permitted to bring Title VII charges against the defendant, because the plaintiff named all the 
defendants of whom she knew at the time of filing her Title VII charge and the court refused to encourage 
"evasion through corporate transfers that would frustrate the equitable power of the Court to make the 
plaintiff whole."). 
103. See Sandoval v. Boulder Reg'!  Communications Ctr., 388 F.3d 1 3 12, 1322 ( 1 0th Cir. 2004) 
(citing Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Clear Creek, 3 1 2  F.3d 1213, 1 220 (10th Cir. 
2002) (factors weighed in determining "whether two nominally separate entities constitute a . . .  single 
employer [for Title VII purposes include] : ( 1 )  interrelations of operations; (2) common management; (3) 
centralized control of labor relations; and ( 4) common ownership and financial control .")). 
104. Cf John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 549 ( 1964) (in a case concerning collective 
bargaining, the Court stated: 
[e]mployees, and the union which represents them, ordinarily do not take part in negotiations 
leading to a change in corporate ownership . . .  [Thus, the] negotiations will ordinarily not 
concern the well-being of the employees, whose advantage or disadvantage, potentially great, 
will inevitably be incidental to the main considerations.). 
105. See Criswell v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1 093, 1094 (9th Cir. 1989) ("In an employment 
discrimination action, there are three principal factors relating to successor liability: ( 1 )  continuity in 
operations and work force of the successor and predecessor employers; (2) notice to the successor 
employer of its predecessor's legal obligation; and (3) ability of the predecessor to provide adequate 
relief directly."); see also Brzozowski, 360 F.3d at 177-78 (cites the aforementioned factors considered in 
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balancing test, noting that successor liability does not apply in all situations in 
which employer assets change hands. 106 The Sixth Circuit has noted that Title VII 
policy justifies the successor liability doctrine, but acknowledges that successor 
liabil ity must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 107 For circuits that 
recognize the successor liability doctrine, changed ownership of a business could 
possibly shield the business from injunction under Title VII . 108 
4. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Continued Prominence in 
Title VII 
The High Court has aided in maintaining the viability of the EEOC as the 
mainstay of Title VII in a number of rulings. The Court has long prohibited 
interpretations of Title VII that prevent potential plaintiffs lacking legal help from 
filing suit. 1 09 Additionally, the Court also afforded protections to the filing of 
EEOC complaints, by prohibiting employers from retaliating against plaintiffs 
who ti le such complaints. 1 1° Further, the Court will not allow local procedural 
rules to frustrate the EEOC 's purpose; the justices upheld the validity of an 
EEOC Title VII complaint arriving at a local clerk's office within the ninety day 
requirement, although the complaint did not meet local filing requirements. 1 1 1  
D. REMEDIES 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 aims "to make persons whole for 
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination"1 12 and 
determining successor liability in employment discrimination cases; explaining that "[t]he mere 
substitution of a reasonable defendant for an insolvent one is not a basis for denying successor liability."). 
1 06. EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 946 (7th Cir. 1 988) ( "[E]mphasis should be on balancing the 
interest in sanctioning unlawful conduct and the interest in facilitating the market in corporate and other 
productive assets."). 
1 07. EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1091 (6th Cir. 1974) ("Title VII per 
se does not prohibit the application of the successor doctrine, but rather mandates its application. Title VII 
was designed to eliminate discrimination in employment and the courts were given broad equitable 
powers to eradicate the present and future effects of past discrimination."). 
I 08 . Cf Miles v. Indiana, 387 F. 3d 591 ,  601 (7th Cir. 2004) (Title VII racial discrimination case in 
which the court affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana's findings 
that the plaintiff, an African-American state trooper, is not entitled to injunctive relief when the defendant 
employee, the Indiana State Police, was under a new administration). 
I 09. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 ( 1 972) (though petitioner porter did not comply with 
EEOC requirements in filing his complaint, the Court enabled Title VII proceedings to continue, holding 
that doing so effects the intent of the Act and noting that the porter did not have legal assistance and the 
respondent company did not show that it would be prejudiced). 
1 1 0. See, e.g., Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 107 1  ( 1 0th Cir. 2004) ("EEOC complaints are 
protected activity."). 
1 1 1 . Loya v. Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 721 F.2d 279, 281 (When a clerk refused to timely file a 
Title VII plaintiff's complaint solely because the paper size did not meet the court's requirements, the 
court held that plaintiff's complaint was duly filed, holding "that for purposes of the statute of limitations 
the district court should regard as 'filed' a complaint which arrives in the custody of the clerk within the 
statutory period but fails to conform with formal requirements in local rules."). 
1 1 2 . Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 4 1 8  ( 1975). 
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prevent future illicit discrimination. 1 13 The 1 972 amendments to the 1964 Act 
reveal that, "the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have 
authority to enforce . . .  [Title VII provisions] . . .  through appropriate rem­
edies."1 14 Upon a favorable finding, a victorious Title VII plaintiff may receive 
both equitable remedies and, as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1 991 ,  1 15 legal 
remedies. 1 16 
1 .  Equitable Remedies 
a. Relief Available. To restore Title VII plaintiffs to the position in which they 
would have been absent the il legal discrimination, Congress enacted 
§706(g), which allows federal courts to order that employers in violation of Title 
VIl provide appropriate equitable relief. l I 7  Equitable remedies include injunc­
tions, instatement/reinstatement, back and/or front pay, attorney's fees and other 
equitable relief deemed necessary to make the plaintiff whole. 1 18 Courts enjoin 
discriminatory behavior to both deter employers from future activities that 
contravene Title VII and eliminate the results of previous discrimination. 1 1 9 
"Injunctive relief is appropriate when a defendant 's primary decision-makers 
comprise the discriminating individuals named in the plaintiff's case." 120 
A trial court may order that a plaintiff be instated or reinstated into a position 
for numerous reasons. The court may demand reinstatement to enable the 
plaintiff to continue in her position absent illicit discrimination, prevent 
employers' retaliatory actions when an employee asserts Title VII rights, allow 
the employer to demonstrate to other employees that the employer adheres to 
Title VII provisions, and protect the plaintiff from financial loss stemming from 
Title VII discrimination. I 2 1 A "mixed motive" plaintiff, one subject to an adverse 
employment decision motivated by other considerations in addition to illicit 
discrimination, cannot receive instatement and reinstatement as remedies under 
Title vn. I 22 
In awarding back pay, courts seek to make prevailing plaintiffs whole and 
1 1 3. See id. at 42 1 .  
l l4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 16(b) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
l l5. See Caviness v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., 105 F.3d 1 2 1 6, 1 2 1 8  (8th Cir. 1 997) (court notes that in 
enacting the 1 99 1  Act, Congress enabled victorious plaintiffs to collect compensatory and punitive 
damages). 
1 16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)( l )  (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) 
1 17. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 ( 1976). 
1 18. Id. 
1 19. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 1 45, 1 54 (1965). 
120. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ilona of Hung., 108 F.3d 1 569, 1 579 (7th Cir. 1 997) (en bane) (citing EEOC
_
v. 
Gurnee Inn Corp., 9 14  F.2d 815, 8 1 7  (7th Cir. 1 990) (finding possibility that discrimination could persist 
where manager who had been aware of discriminatory conduct was still employed by the defendant)). 
12 1 .  See ROBERT BELTON & DIANNE AVERY, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 794 ( 1 999); see also 
Robert Belton, Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law § 7.4 ( 1 992). 
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(ii) ( West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
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prevent future illicit employment discrimination. 123 Thus, the Act enables district 
courts to award back pay up to two years prior to the filing of the applicable 
EEOC charge. 1 24 A plaintiff can usually receive back pay from the date of the 
il l icit discriminatory action to the date of her judgment. 125 Some courts do not 
indude time accrued in the back pay calculation, after the point at which the 
employer would have otherwise terminated the plaintiff. 126 Because back pay 
seeks to put a Title VII plaintiff in the position she would have been absent the 
discriminatory action, courts award the Title VII plaintiff the compensation 
denied her because of the illicit practice. 1 27 
In l imited cases, instead of reinstating a plaintiff, a court can also award front 
pay, the equivalent of the compensation a plaintiff would have received if she 
were reinstated. 1 28 Courts have considered several factors in determining the 
appropriateness of front pay, including the presence of intimidating behavior 
towards the plaintiff, the effect of the illicit action on the complainant's emotional 
health, and the feasibility of reinstatement in light of the employer-(former) 
employee relationship . 129 In calculating front pay, courts can assess whether the 
plaintiff met her duty to mitigate damages, would have retained employment 
absent discrimination, and/or acted with "unclean hands."130 
To receive attorney's fees in a Title VII suit, a plaintiff must substantially 
prevail on a "significant claim" pertaining to her suit, 13 1 or the court will limit the 
1 2 .l See. e.f?., Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 4 1 7  F.2d 1 1 22, l l25 (5th Cir. 1969); see also 
Moysis v. OTG Datanet, 278 F.3d 8 1 9, 828 (8th Cir. 2002). 
1 24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)( l )  (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
1 25. But see Gloria v. Valley Grain Prods., 72 F.3d 497, 499 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (denial of 
plaintiff's appeal for back pay up to the final judgment, because plaintiff accepted the lower court's 
settlement without complaint, and the court considered damages accumulating after the trial date as a 
separate issue). 
1 26. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub!. Co., 5 1 3  U.S. 352, 362 (1995) ("The beginning 
point in the trial court's formulation of a remedy should be calculation of back pay from the date of the 
unlawful discharge to the date the new information [that would have resulted in complainant's 
1crmina1ion] was discovered."). 
1 27. Thome v. El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1 13 1 ,  l l 36 (9th Cir. 1986). 
1 28.  See, e.g., Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 837 F.2d 1550, 1562 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1988). 
1 29.  See EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 619 ( 1 1th Cir. 2000). 
1 30. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 384 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (since there is a statutory duty to 
mi1iga1e damages, courts have held that a precondition for a claim for back pay and reinstatement or front 
pay under Title VII is that the plaintiff be in all manner ready, willing and legally capable of performing 
ahernale work at the commencement and through the back pay period); see also Calloway v. Partners 
Nat' I Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 450-5 1 ( 1 1th Cir. 1993) (The court stated: 
"For a defendant to successfully avail itself of the doctrine of unclean hands, it must satisfy two 
requirements. First, the defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff's wrongdoing is directly 
related to the claim against which it is asserted. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 
290 U.S. 240, 245 ( 1933). Second, even if directly related, the plaintiff's wrongdoing does not 
bar relief unless the defendant can show that it was personally injured by her conduct. Mitchell 
Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 9 1 7, 1 00 ( 1 980)."). 
1 3 1 .  See Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791 ( 1 989). 
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award, awarding fees commensurate with the plaintiff's success on her claim. 1 32 
Courts often use the lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney's fees . 1 33 
The lodestar method requires that the plaintiff show the reasonableness of the 
time charged for the case and the reasonableness of the hourly rate charged. 1 34 A 
court must peg plaintiff's claims as frivolous or unreasonable to award a 
defendant attorney's fees. 1 35 
A court may order other equitable relief. 1 36 Available equitable relief includes 
affirmative action designed to counter the effects of discriminatory practices 1 37 
and settlement agreements corresponding with the goals of Title VII. 1 38 
b. Mixed Motive Cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1 99 1  codifies Title VII 
plaintiffs' right to receive limited relief in mixed motive cases--cases where 
discrimination based on Title VII protected classes constitutes at least one of the 
factors motivating actions spurring a Title VII plaintiff's claim. 139 The 1 99 1  Act, 
in relevant part, states that: 
[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complain­
ing party demonstrates that . .. sex ... was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice; 140 and if an individual proves a violation under section 
2000e-2(m), the employer can avail itself of a limited affirmative 
defense that restricts the available remedies if it demonstrates that it 
would have taken the same action absent the impermissible motivating 
factor.141 
In resolving a circuit split, the Supreme Court has determined that 2000 (e)-2(m) 
does not require direct evidence, so a Title VII plaintiff can thus use circumstan­
tial evidence in seeking relief in a mixed-motive case. 142 A plaintiff in a mixed 
motive case is only entitled to declaratory relief, limited injunctive relief, and 
132. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461  U.S. 424, 435-36 (1 983). 
133. See id. at 443. 
134. See Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1 999). 
1 35. See Christiansburg Gannent Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 4 1 2, 422 ( 1 978). 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
137. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 1 49, 166 (1 987). 
138. Cf EEOC v. Astra U.S.A.,  Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 745 ( 1 st Cir. 1996) (injunction affirmed against an 
employer's settlement agreements preventing employees from corresponding with the EEOC, because 
such a settlement would obfuscate Title VII policy). 
139. See J. FRIEDMAN & G. STRICKLER, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 986 (5th ed. 2001).  
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2003e-2(m) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
141 .  42 U.S.C. § 2003-5(g)(2)(B) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
142. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (Court determined that Cong�e�s' 
definition of "demonstrates" as used in Title VII does not indicate that Title VTI plaintiffs must utihze 
direct evidence to show discrimination). 
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attorney 's fees/costs if the respondent can show that he would have made the 
same adverse decision regarding plaintiff's employment. 143 
2. Legal Remedies 
Also in the 1 99 1  Act, Congress made compensatory and punitive144 damages 
avai lable under Title VII in cases where an employer has intentionally 
discriminated against a plaintiff in contravention of Title VII. 145 The 1991 Act 
caps the amount of legal remedies recoverable; applicable caps depend on the 
employer's size. 146 The caps do not apply to relief available before the 1991 
amend ment, such as back pay, front pay, and other previously available relief. 147 
Additionally, if a plaintiff resides in a state without a damages cap, the plaintiff 
can possibly bring the state claim in federal court to avoid the Title VII caps with 
respect to the state law claim. 148 The Supreme Court has construed the 1991 Act's 
provision allowing the EEOC to provide appropriate remedies as permitting the 
EEOC to require discriminatory federal agency employers to pay compensatory 
damages to a wronged plaintiff. 149 A complainant seeking compensatory and 
punitive damages can also elect to have her case heard by a jury. 150 Punitive 
damages are only available when defendants act "with malice or reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual."151 A 
plainti ff cannot receive legal remedies for Title VII violations that took place 
hefore Congress enacted the 1 991 Amendment. 1 52 A mixed motive plaintiff also 
may not receive punitive damages if other factors motivated the disputed action 
in addition to illicit discrimination. 153 
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
144. Kolstad v. A m .  Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 ( 1 999) (section of the 1 991 Act allowing 
punitive damages in Title VII cases "does not require a showing of egregious or outrageous 
discrimination independent of the employer's state of mind."). 
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 98 l a(a)(l )  (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 98 l a(b)(3) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). If defendant employer has 
more than fifteen but less than I 00 employees, a plaintiff i n  a Title VII intentional discrimination case can 
receive up to $50,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. If the employer has 1 0 1 to 201 employees, 
the plaintiff can receive up to $100,000; for an employer with 201 -500 employees, the plaintiff can 
receive up to $200,000; for an employer with over 500,000, $300,000 is the maximum amount of 
compensatory and punitive damages a plaintiff can receive. See id. 
147. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory 
and Punitive Damages, (July 1 992), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/daroages.htrnl (last 
visited Apr. 1 1 ,  2005). 
148. See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prod., Inc., 2 1 2  F.3d 493, 5 1 6  (9th Cir. 2000). 
149. See West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 2 1 2, 223 ( 1 999). 
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 1 98 la(c) (West, W ESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
1 5 1 .  42 U.S.C. § 1 98 l a(b)( 10) (West, W ESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
153.  Landgraf v. Usi Film P rods., 5 1 1 U.S. 244 , 285-86 (1994). 
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II. THE TITLE VII CASE 
A. DISPARATE TREATMENT 
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, 
discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to her 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 1 54 It is also unlawful for 
an employer to limit, segregate, or classify her employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect her status as an 
employee, because of such individual 's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin. 155 In order to prevail on a Title VII disparate sex treatment claim, an 
employee only has to establish that, but for her sex, she would have been treated 
differently. 1 56 Although the employee must prove that the employer acted 
intentionally, the intent does not have to be malicious. 1 57 Liability in a disparate 
treatment case depends on whether the protected trait actually motivated the 
employer's decision. 1 58 Disparate treatment is one of two theories of intentional 
discrimination recognized under Title VII, the other theory being one of pattern 
or practice discrimination. 1 59 The Court has recognized, however, that disparate 
treatment is the most easily understood type of discrimination. 1 60 Disparate 
treatment was the most obvious evil Congress sought to fight against with the 
passage of the 1 964 Civil Rights Act. 1 6 1  
Disparate treatment claims require proof of discriminatory intent either 
through direct or circumstantial evidence. 1 62 Direct evidence establishes the 
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)( l )  (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
156. Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 329 F.3d !076, 1 079 (9th Cir. 2004). 
157. See id. 
158. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003). 
159. See Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 724 ( l  l th Cir. 2004) , citing EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, 220 
F.3d 1263, 1274 (I I th Cir. 2000) (in a "pattern and practice" disparate treatment case, the plaintiff must 
prove, normally through a combination of statistics and anecdotes, that discrimination is the company's 
standard operating procedure). 
160. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 324, 335 ( 1 977) (The 
Court stated: 
Disparate treatment such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily understood type of 
discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of 
their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, 
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.). 
161 .  See id., citing 1 IO CONG. REC. 1 3088 ( 1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (Senator Humphrey 
stated: 
"What the bill does . . .  is simply to make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying 
employment. It provides that men and women shall be employed on the basis of their 
qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as 
colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States"). 
162. See Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 723 (I I th Cir. 2004). 
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existence of discriminatory intent behind an employment decision without 
requiring any inference or presumption. 1 63 Since direct evidence involves blatant 
and transparent remarks, it is encountered infrequently. 164 Because direct 
evidence of intentional discrimination rarely exists, employees have to rely on 
drcumstantial evidence to prove intentional discrimination. When using circum­
stantial evidence to prove intentional discrimination, plaintiffs can use the 
framework established in McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green. 165 This analysis, 
commonly known as the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting framework, 
requires a plaintiff to show: 1 )  that she belongs to the protected class; 2) that she 
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants; 3) that, despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and 4) that, after 
her rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications. 166 
The McDonnell Douglass test is the predominant form of pretext jurispru­
dence. The three parts of the test are: 1)  the establishment of a prima facie case, 2) 
the defendant's articulation of at least one legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
( LNR) for the job action, and 3) the pretext stage. 167 In St. Mary 's  Honor Center 
v. Hicks, 1 68 the Court held that the McDonnell Douglass test was purely 
procedural. 1 69 In the aftermath of Hicks, the McDonnell Douglass test merely 
forces the employer to respond to the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting 
evidence from which the fact finder can reach her own conclusion. 170 The 
McDonnell Douglass test therefore serves as a tool to trigger the presumption of 
discrim ination after the presentation of the prima facie case and also provides a 
structure for the defendant's response in rebutting that presumption. 
In mixed motive cases, both legitimate and illegitimate factors prompt an 
employment decision . 1 7 1  To address this complexity, the Court added additional 
speci ficity to disparate treatment jurisprudence with the addition of the motivat­
ing factor test. 1 72 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 1 73 the Court employed a 
motivating factor test to be used when legitimate and illegitimate factors combine 
to bring about a job action. 174 Title VII was amended in 1991 to require that any 
1 63.  See Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1 1 72, 1 1 82 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2001). 
1 64. See Cooper, 390 F.3d at 724 n . 15 .  
1 65.  4 1 1 U.S. 792 ( 1 973); see also Cooper, 390 F.3d at 723-24. 
1 66.  McDonnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 4 1 1  U.S. 792, 802 ( 1 973). 
1 67 .  Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title Vll Dispara/e 
7i"m1111e11t Cases, 57 SMU L. REv. 83, 85 (2004). 
1 68. 509 U.S. 502 ( 1 993 ). 
1 69. Id. at 52 1 .  
1 70. See Chambers, supra note 1 67, at 88. 
1 7 1 .  See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003). 
1 72 .  Chambers, supra note 1 67, at 84. 
1 73 .  490 U.S. 228 (1 989). 
1 74. See id. at 249-250 (The Court stated: 
In I mixed motive cases], we emphasized [that] the employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of 
a rnoti ve that is declared i l legitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the 
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illegitimate consideration of a protected trait in an employment decision 
constitutes a per se violation of Title VII, regardless of its proportional influence 
in the final decision. 175 The Court has maintained that the standard of proof for a 
prima facie case of disparate treatment is a preponderance of the evidence, 
meaning that the weight of the evidence points to an illegitimate discriminatory 
motive. 176 Once it is shown that the an employer's employment practice was, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, discriminatory, the burden shifts to the 
employer to rebut the presumption and show a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the employment decision. 
Since McDonnell Douglass and Price Waterhouse, disparate treatment cases 
have been grouped into three categories: standard, McDonnell Douglass pretext, 
and Price Waterhouse mixed motives. In the years since Price Waterhouse, the 
weight of these distinctions has been lessened and disparate treatment cases are 
generally treated the same. 177 
1 .  Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case 
a. Individual Disparate Treatment. Individual disparate treatment occurs when 
an employee alleges her employer discriminated against her because she is a part 
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the 
risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing . . .  
we have concluded that the plaintiff who shows that an impermissible motive played a 
motivating part in an adverse employment decision has thereby placed upon the defendant the 
burden to show that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the unlawful 
motive). 
175. See Pub. L. No. 102- 1 66, 105 Stat. 1 07 1  (1991 )  (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) (West, 
WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2) ("Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice."). But see Carey v. Mt. Desert Island Hosp., 1 56 F.3d 3 1 ,  38-40 ( 1 st Cir. 
1998) (no error found when jury inquiry regarding meaning of term "motivating factor," specifically 
asking "how much weight is to be rendered to make decision," received instruction that plaintiff had 
burden to show "it is more likely than not that gender was a motivating or determining factor in the firing 
of the plaintiff by the defendant. . . .  If you find that the plaintiff was discharged for reasons other than his 
gender you must find for the defendant," because reversal would "impose an unrealistic burden of 
perfection on a court facing the constant pressures of trial."). 
176. See Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 ( 1 982) (The Court stated: 
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous. The 
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available 
position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to 
an inference of unlawful discrimination.). 
177. See generally Chambers, supra note 1 67, at 84. Chambers suggests that since in St. Mary s Honor 
Center v. Hicks and Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, the Court eliminated the effect of the pretext test and the 
distinction between standard and pretext cases, they have interpreted the motivating factor test in a 
manner that eliminates the distinction between mixed motives and non mixed motives cases. Chambers 
explores whether this collapse in Title VII distinctions will result in shifting more discretion to trial 
judges. Id. 
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of a protected group based on race, sex, national origin, or religion. 178 At all times 
the plaintiff carries the ultimate burden of proving to the fact finder that an 
employer intentionally discriminated against her. 179 The following categories 
outline several ways in which a plaintiff claims intentional discrimination on the 
hasis of sex: (i) failure to hire or promote, (ii) discharge, (iii) disciplinary action, 
( iv) constructive discharge, (v) compensation, and (vi) employer retaliation 
against an employee for filing a Title VII claim. 
i .  Hiring and Promotion. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in 
hiring or promotion, an unsuccessful applicant or employee charging an 
employer with sex discrimination must prove that: 1 )  she is a member of a 
protected class, 2) she applied for and was qualified for a job or promotion for 
which the employer was seeking applicants, 3) despite the applicant's qualifica­
tions. she was rejected for the position, and 4) after the plaintiff's rejection the 
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from 
individuals with similar qualifications. 1 80 
Courts distinguish under what conditions an employee can bring a claim of 
fai lure to promote. An employee cannot sustain a claim of discrimination in 
promotion if an employer monitors a formal system for hiring and promotion and 
the employee fails to express a desire to be promoted or expresses a desire to be 
promoted but does not follow the formal procedures. 1 8 1  
1 78. See Renerally Burlington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 1 86 F.3d 1301, 1 3 1 9  ( 10th Cir. 1 999) 
(disparate treatment analysis focuses on the treatment of individual employees and not on general action 
towards a group.) 
1 79. See id. at 1 3 1 5  ("Because disparate treatment is a form of intentional discrimination, the plaintiff 
must prove that his employer acted with a discriminatory intent or motive."). 
180. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4 1 1  U.S. 792, 802 (1 973) (an employee claiming race 
discrimination must prove: 
( i )  that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which 
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 
(i v) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.);  
.iee also Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.  Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.6 ( 1 981)  (prima facie elements as 
articulated in McDonnell Douglass applied in sex discrimination case.); Gu v. Boston Police Dep't, 3 1 2  
F.>d 6 .  1 0  ( 1 st Cir. 2002) (female applicants made a prima facie case o f  discrimination, demonstrating 
that: ( I )  they are women ;  (2) they applied for or expressed interest in the positions; and (3) they did nut 
receive either job.). 
1 8 1 .  See Williams v. Giant Food, Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 2004) (The court stated: 
If an employer has a formal system of posting vacancies and allowing employees to apply for 
such vacancies, an employee who fails to apply for a particular position cannot establish a 
prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote. In such a circumstance, the employee's 
general requests for advancement are insufficient to support a claim for failure to promote. On 
the other hand, if the employer fails to make its employees aware of vacancies, the application 
requirement may be relaxed and the employee treated as if she had actually applied for a 
specific position.); 
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ii.  Discharge. A claimant who files a complaint against her employer for 
discrimination based on sex after being discharged must prove: I )  that she is a 
member of a protected class, 2) that her performance adequately met her 
employer's expectations, 3) that despite her performance, she was discharged or 
demoted, and 4) that after her termination or demotion, the employer either 
sought a replacement candidate with similar qualifications or replaced the 
claimant with an employee who was not a member of the claimant's protected 
class, or both. 1 82 A split among the courts as to the fourth prong of the discharge 
test can be traced to the Supreme Court's failure to clearly articulate a position 
regarding that prong. 1 83 The majority of the circuit courts do not require that the 
claimant show that her successor was not a member of her protected class. 1 84 
Some courts deem the replacement's characteristics to be important to, but not 
determinative of, their decision. 1 85 Certain circuits mandate the employer replace 
see also Smith v. J. Smith Lanier & Co., 352 F.3d 1 342, 1 345 (I I th Cir. 2003) (general interest in being 
rehired without submitting an application is not enough to establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination when a defendant-employer has publicized an open position). 
182. See Walker v. MCI Telecom Corp., 1 999 WL 503534, at *4 (4th Cir. 1 999) (unpublished table 
decision) (per curiam) (prim a  facie elements of Title VII discriminatory charge claim outlined); see also 
Neuren v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1 5 1 2  (D.C. Cir. 1 995); Cumpiano v. Banco 
Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 1 53 ( l st Cir. 1990). 
183. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 528 n. I ( 1 993) (Souter, J. ,  dissenting) (The 
Court stated: 
The majority, following the courts below, mentions that Hicks' position was filled by a white 
male . . . . This Cowt has not direcciy addressed the question whether the personal 
characteristics of someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material, and that issue is 
not before us today.). 
But cf O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 5 1 7  U.S.  308, 3 1 2  ( 1 996) (Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act violation found applying McDonnell Douglas test: "the fact that one person in the 
protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost 
out because of his [status as a member of a protected class]''). 
1 84. Toth v. Gates Rubber Co., 2000 WL 796068 ( 1 0th Cir. 2000) (unpublished disposition) (plaintiff 
may also be able to satisfy her prima facie burden simply by introducing evidence that the position was 
not eliminated without also demonstrating that she was replaced by someone outside her protected class) 
(quoting Perry v. Woodward, 1 99 F.3d 1 126, 1 140 ( 1 0th Cir. 1 999), cert. denied, 529 U.S.  1 1 10 (2000) 
(Hispanic plaintiff alleging discriminatory discharge on the basis of race had satisfied the fourth element 
of the prima facie test without showing that her replacement was outside her protected class)). 
1 85. See, e.g., Nieto v. L & H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 62 1 ,  624 (5th Cir. 1997) (evidence that 
replacement was within plaintiff's protected class is "not outcome determinative," but is "certainly 
material to the question of discriminatory intent"); Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 1 5�, 159 
(7th Cir. 1996) (evidence that replacement was not protected class member, while i t  "may help to raise an 
inference of discrimination . . .  it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition"); Cumpiano v. Banco 
Santander P.R. , 902 F.2d 1 48, 1 54- 1 55 ( 1 st Cir. 1 990) (replacement employee's characteristics "m�y have 
evidentiary force in a particular case," however, fourth prong may be satisfied "simply by showing that 
· 
. . the employer had a continued need for someone to perform the same work after [the compl�man�] 
left"); Walker v. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr., 1 88 F.2d 554, 558 (8th Cir. 1 989) (the sex o.
f the plaintiff s 
replacement is a relevant consideration but not necessaril y  a determinative factor m whether she 
established a prima facie case of discri�ination); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 996 (�d Cir. I 985) 
(evidence that replacement was within plaintiff's protected class "may weaken, but certainly does no
t 
eliminate, the inference of discrimination"); Schwartz v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 930 F. Supp. 3, 8 
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the employee with someone who was not a member of the employee's protected 
group. 1 86 
S imilar prima facie case requirements exist when the complainant claims she 
was discriminated against during a reduction-in-force (RIF) layoff. In these cases 
the claimant must demonstrate that: 1 )  she is a member of a protected class; 2) 
she was selected for discharge from a larger group of employees; 3) she was 
performing at a level largely equivalent to the lowest category of the group 
maintained; and 4) the selection process for discharge resulted in more favored 
treatment for similarly situated employees who were not members of the 
claimant's protected class. 1 87 
i ii. Disciplinary Action. In a claim of disparate treatment on the basis of sex 
in the manner in which an employee is disciplined, the plaintiff must show that: 
I ) she belongs to a protected class as specified in Title VII; 2) that she was 
qualified for the job that she holds or held; and 3) that a similarly situated 
employee engaged in identical or similar misconduct but received lesser or no 
discipl ine. 1 88 
iv. Constructive Discharge. Courts may recognize situations where the work 
conditions are so unreasonably intolerable that a responsible employee would 
feel forced to resign. In order to demonstrate that a company's actions amounted 
to a constructive discharge the plaintiff most show: 1 )  the deliberateness of the 
company's actions, and 2)  that a reasonable employee encountering such 
situation would leave her position. 189 A constructive discharge claim involves the 
< D.D.C. 1 996) (evidence that replacement was within plaintiff's protected class is relevant but not 
tlispositive to fourth prong). 
1 86. See Bradshaw v. Pac. Bell, 72 Fed. Appx. 532 (9th Cir. 2003) (African-American employee failed 
to establish prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII arising from his tennination of 
employment, given lack of evidence that employee was replaced by someone outside of his protected 
class . ) :  Lovas v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 215 F.3d 1 326 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision), 
available at 2000 WL 7 1 2355, at *5 ("A prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII requires a 
plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that . . .  she was replaced by a person outside 
of the protected class."). 
1 87. See Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Verwey v. IU. Coll. of 
Optometry, 43 Fed. Appx. 996, 999 (7th Cir. 2002) (When the discharged employee's duties are absorbed 
by other employees, the "similarly situated" prong is inappropriate. This is situation is called a 
"mini-RlF." even in cases where more than one employee has been terminated. A "mini-RIF'' requires a 
plaintiff to establish that her duties were absorbed by employees who were not members of the protected 
class.) .  
1 88 .  See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1 303, 1336 ( 1 1th Cir. 2000). 
1 89. See Pa. State Police v. Suders, 1 24 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004) (The Court stated: 
For an atmosphere of sexual harassment or hostility to be actionable, the offending behavior 
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and 
create an abusive working environment. A hostile-environment constructive discharge claim 
entails something more: a plaintiff who advances such a compound claim must show working 
conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.) 
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employee's decision to leave and the precipitating conduct. '90 To prevail on a 
disparate treatment claim asserting a constructive discharge, the employee must 
give her employer a reasonable amount of time to correct the unlawful 
discriminatory practice prior to her resignation. 1 9 1  In most constructive discharge 
claims, the court examines whether the employer had notice of the harassing 
working conditions and whether the employee took advantage of the established 
avenues of redress or just unreasonably resigned. 192 
v. Compensation. In order to establish a prima facie case of sex-based wage 
or salary discrimination, a plaintiff must show that she is intentionally paid less 
for performing substantially comparable work to the work performed by one or 
more members of the opposite sex. 1 93 With the exception of the requirements for 
claims of "comparable worth," the Title VII prima facie case of compensation 
discrimination based on sex is similar to the prima facie requirements under the 
Equal Pay Act. 194 A key difference, however, is that per the McDonnell Douglass 
standard the claimant must offer at least inferential evidence that the salary 
disparity i s  a product of the employer's intentional discrimination against her on 
account of her gender. 195 
vi. Retaliation. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against 
any employees or applicants for employment because they have opposed 
unlawful practices or made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. 196 In order to prevail on a 
retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that: 1 )  she engaged in 
190. See id. at 2355. 
19 1 .  See id. at 2347. 
192. See generally Shari M. Goldsmith, Casenote, The Supreme Court's Sunders Problem: Wrong 
Question, Wrong Facts Detennining Whether Constructive Discharge ls a Tangible Employment Action, 
6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 8 1 7  (2004). 
193. See Belfi v. Prendergast, 1 9 1  F.3d 1 29, 140 (2d Cir. 1999) ("In order to make out a prima facie 
case of unequal pay for equal work under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that ( l )  she is a member of a 
protected class; and (2) she was paid less than non-members of her class for work requiring substantially 
the same responsibility."); see also Lawrence v. CNF Transp. , Inc., 340 F.3d 486, 493-94 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(employee prevailed on gender discrimination claim under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII because she 
was paid less than her successor and was denied a benefit given to him); Sprague v. Thom Ams., l 29 F.3d 
1355, 1 363 ( 1 0th Cir. 2003) ("A female Title VII plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of sex 
discrimination by showing that she occupies a job similar to that of higher paid males." (quoting Meeks v. 
Computer Assocs. Int'!, 15 F.3d !0 13  at 1 0 1 9  ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 994)). But see Adams v. CBS Broad., Inc., 6 1  
Fed. Appx. 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2003) (Supreme Court has not articulated how the standard four-part 
McDonnell-Douglas analysis should be tailored to wage discrimination claims); Ghosh v. Ind. Dep't of 
Envtl. Mgmt., 1 92 F.3d 1 087, 1 094 (7th Cir. 1 999) (Title VII has no definitive standard for establishing 
prima facie case of compensation discrimination). 
194. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
195. McDonnell Douglass v. Green, 4 1 1  U.S. 792, 802 ( 1 973). See Belfi v. Prendergast, 1 9 1  F.3d 1 29, 
l 39 (2nd Cir. 1 999) (Title VII plaintiff must proffer evidence of "discriminatory animus" to establish a 
prima facie case in addition to requirements under EPA). 
196. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
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protected conduct under Title VII; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action; 
and 3)  there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the 
adverse employment action. 197 If, for instance, a wife and husband work at the 
same company and the wife experiences retaliatory discrimination for the acts of 
the husband, she may be able to bring a retaliation claim against her employer. 
Courts are split on whether Title VII retaliation protection extends to third 
• 1 98 parties. 
In some circuits whether an employment action is "adverse" is considered on a 
<.:asc-by-case basis. 1 99 Adverse acts carry "a significant risk of humiliation, 
damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment pros-
1 1!7. Sec, <'.}:., Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 37 1 F.3d 1 233,  1 237 ( 10th Cir. 2004); Erenberg v. Methodist 
l losp. , .157 E.\<l 787, 793 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Walcott v. City of Cleveland, 2005 WL 14982 (6th Cir. 
:!IKl:'i I ( tmpuhlishe<l opinion) (The court stated: 
To cstahlish a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment 
action. a plaintiff must present evidence 'sufficient to raise the inference that her protected 
activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.'  Temporal proximity alone, without 
additional evidence of a retaliatory animus, will not suffice to support a finding of a causal 
connection. ) ;  
I f i l l-Dyson v .  City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002) (four requirements of modified 
\kl>nnndl Douglass burden-shifting framework: 
that the plaintiff I )  engaged in statutorily protected activity; 2) performed her job according to 
her emp loyer's legitimate expectations; 3) suffered a materially adverse employment action 
despite meeting her employer's legitimate expectations; and 4) was treated less favorably than 
similarly situated employees who did not engage in statutorily protected activity); 
I >own s v. Postmaster General, 3 1  Fed. Appx. 848, 850 (6th Cir. 2002) (additional standard includes that 
plaintiff must show that defendant was aware of the right to be protected against retaliation). 
1 98. Compare EEOC v. Ohio Edison Co., 7 F.3d 5 4 1 ,  545-46 (6th Cir. 1993) (third party retaliation 
t· laims comport with purpose of Title VII) with Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 8 1 3, 819 (8th Cir. 
l 998 ) ( textual interpretation of Title VII prohibits third party claims). See generally Anita G. Schausten, 
( ·ornment. Retaliation Against Third Parties: A Potential Loophole in Title Vl/'s Discrimination 
l'mrerrio11. 37 J .  MARSHALL L. REv. 1 3 1 3  (2004) (discussing permissibility of third party retaliation 
claims ). 
1 99. See Hockman v. Westward Comms., LLC, 2004 WL 298035 1 (5th Cir. 2004) (in determining 
whether a defendant's action constitutes an adverse employment action, courts are concerned solely with 
ultimate employment decisions; ultimate employment decisions include acts such as hiring, granting 
leave. discharging, promoting, and compensating.); see also Clayton v. Rumsfeld, 1 06 Fed. Appx. 268, 
270 (5th Cir. 2004) (Interlocutory or intermediate decisions that can lead to an ultimate decision are 
insufficient to support a prima facie case of retaliation. Consequently, the ultimate employment decision 
doctrine requires that actionable adverse employment actions have more than a mere tangential effect on 
a possible future ultimate employment decision.); White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry., 364 F.3d 
789. 797-98 (6th Cir. 2004) (Reassignments without salary or work hour changes do not ordinarily 
constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims. A reassignment without 
sal ary or work hour changes, however, may be an adverse employment action if it constitutes a demotion 
evi denced by "a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material 
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation."). But see Smith v. City of 
Sa lem . .169 F.3d 912, 922 (6th Cir. 2004) (where fireman was suspended for twenty-four hours, the 
�mployment action sufficiently satisfied the requirements of an adverse employment action. Since 
hrcmen work in twenty-four hour shifts, the suspension amounted to the equivalent of a loss of pay for 
60'k of the workweek.). 
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pects."200 Courts usually find that an "adverse employment action" does not 
encompass a mere inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities, but that the 
action must be "materially adverse" to the employee's job status, such as a 
change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities20 1  The retaliation may also take 
place after termination of employment.202 
b. Systemic Disparate Treatment. Systemic disparate treatment is a recurring 
practice, a consistent attitude, or prevalent attitudes and beliefs inculcated into 
the work environment that prove intentional discrimination on account of 
gender. 203 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 204 the 
defining case for systemic disparate treatment, the Court held that an employer 
who does not habitually discriminate should, over time, develop within its labor 
force an incidence of protected group representation not considerably less than. 
that group's representation in an available pool of qualified c andidates.205 
Systemic disparate treatment is demonstrated by a considerable labor force 
under-representation of a protected group relative to the incidence one would 
anticipate based on its members' interest, availability, and qualifications. 206 In 
200. See Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 3 7 1  F.3d 1 233, I 239 ( 1 0th Cir. 2004) (The court stated: 
We liberally define the phrase adverse employment action and do not limit such actions to 
monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits. In so defining the phrase, we c onsider acts 
that carry a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to 
future employment prospects. Therefore, an action that significantly harms a plaintiff's future 
employment prospects may be considered an adverse action.). 
201. See DiBrino v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 1 I 8  Fed. Appx. 533, 2004 WL 2861673 (2d Cir. 2004) 
("An adverse action must be a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. To 
be materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be more disruptive than a mere 
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities."). 
202. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 5 1 9  U.S.  337, 346 ( 1 997) (former employees are included under 
Title VII's protections); see also Fischer v. AT&T Corp., 1998 WL 78996 (7th Cir. I998) ("Post­
termination acts of retaliation that undermine a former employee's future employment prospects or 
otherwise have a nexus to employment are actionable under Title VIL"). 
203. See 1 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION COMPILATION MANUAL (BNA) 2:0005, cited in Jenson v. Eveleth 
Taconite Co., 1 30 F.3d 1287, 1 30 1  (8th Cir. 1 997) (The court stated: 
Employment policies or practices that serve to differentiate or to perpetuate a differentiation in 
terms or conditions of employment of applicants or employees because of their status as 
members of a particular group . . . .  Systemic discrimination . . .  concerns a recurring practice or 
continuing policy rather than an isolated act of discrimination.). 
204. 43 l U.S. 324 (1977). 
205. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 ( 1 977). 
206. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 3 1 2  ( 1 977) (where special 
qualifications are at issue, the relevant statistical pool must refer to the number of members of the plaintiff 
class qualified for, interested in, and able to commute to the particular task); see also Alexander v. Fulton 
County, 207 F.3d 1 303, 1 327-28 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2000) (laymen are not considerably qualified for the law 
enforcement positions in question, and observing that evidence of a minority's under representation in an 
employer's workforce by reference to the general population can make one infer discrimination only m 
the rare case "involving jobs with low skill levels where the applicant pool can be considered roughly 
coextensive with the general population".). 
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Haz.e/wood School District v. United States,
207 the Court held that Title VII 
makes no explicit requirements that the workforce mirror the general population 
in its racial, ethnic, religious, or gender make-up. 208 
Employment procedures that result in unequal representation are not saved by 
an employer's good intentions or absence of discriminatory intent.209 Systemic 
disparate treatment can be proven from a facially discriminatory policy, from 
. . d '  . t t 21 0 d t 1 'd 2 1 1 b' stat1st1cs on 1sproport10na e ou comes, anec o a ev1 ence, or a com ma-
t ion of all of these factors.212 In a systemic disparate treatment case seeking 
dass-wide injunctive or declaratory relief, plaintiffs need not present evidence 
that each person who seeks relief was a victim of the employer's discriminatory 
policy to establish their prima facie case.2 13 Rather, the burden is to prove only 
that the discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure. This 
may be done through statistics alone.214 
i. Formal Policies. Title VII prohibits formal employer policies which 
establish distinctions that classify certain occupations as male or female 
.:!07. 4�� U.S. 299 ( 1 977). 
:!OX. S<•c• Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 ( 1 977) (The Court stated: 
Ahsent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will 
in t irne result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of 
the population in the community from which employees are hired. Evidence of long-lasting and 
i:mss disparity between the composition of a work force and that of the general population thus 
may he significant even though § 703 U) makes clear that Title VII imposes no requirement that 
a work force mirror the general population.); 
,,.,. al.w Van v. Plant & Field Serv. Corp., 672 F.Supp. 1 306, 1 3 1 2  (C.D. CA 1987), aff'd, Van v. Plant & 
held Serv. Corp .. 872 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1 989) (The court stated: 
Traditional proof of discrimination begins with the determination of a disparity between the 
minority group's representation in a relevant population and that group's representation in the 
particular position under scrutiny. The demonstration of a percentage difference between the 
two is sufficient to constitute a violation of Title VII, even absent an explanation in terms of 
di ffering job-related abilities. The law initially presumes that no such disparity exists.). 
209. l111emational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 43 1 U.S. at 343 ("Affirmations of good faith in making 
individual selections are insufficient to dispel a prima facie case of systematic exclusion." (citing 
A l exander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 ( 1972))) . 
.:! I 0. Id. at 339 ("Statistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important role in cases 
in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue." (citing Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational 
Equality League, 4 15  U .S .  605, 620 (1 974))) . 
.:! 1 1 . Sl'(' Alexander, 207 F.3d at 1 325 (anecdotal evidence concerning discriminatory treatment of 
�imilarly situated co-plaintiffs or nonparties who are members of a complainant's protected group 
"undoubtedly are relevant to every other plaintiff's core allegation of systemic discrimination); see also 
Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1 354, 1361  ( 1 1 th Cir. 1999) (anecdotal evidence 
is s ignificant in cases of individual plaintiffs alleging individual disparate treatment). 
2 1 2 . See HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 3.2 1 (200 1)  . 
.:! I J. Beck v. Boeing Co., 60 Fed. Appx. 38, 3-4 (9th Cir. 2003) . 
.:! 1 4. Id. 
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positions,2 15 sex-specific employment guidelines without imposing comparable 
requirements for employees of the opposite sex,2 16 and the disparate compensa­
tion or provision of benefit plans which either provide benefits at different 
rates217  or require different contributions218  based on the employee's sex are 
prohibited under Title VII.2 19  If an employer's policy draws distinctions based on 
a prohibited characteristic a group of complainants can establish a disparate 
treatment claim based solely upon that policy. 220 
A policy that facially discriminates between employees on account of their sex 
is a per se violation of Title VII. The defendant may escape liability, however, by 
asserting a bona fide Occupational Qualification defense (BFOQ).22 1 This 
defense is not applicable in the context of race, and the defendant employer bears 
215 .  See, e.g., Long v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1553, 
1559 (D. Md. 1 995) (Title VII violation found when employer refused to interview female candidate for 
road controller position in Japan operations, despite her qualifications, based on preference for male 
employee to occupy position because refusal constituted formal policy of discrimination). 
2 16. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1 028, 1029- 1030 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(personal appearance regulations with differing requirements for women and men do not violate Title VII 
as long as requirement is justified by some commonly accepted social norm and it is reasonably related to 
employer's business needs; however, an employer who imposes separate dress requirements for women 
and men performing same jobs will be in violation of Title VII when one sex can wear regular business 
attire and other is forced to wear not just specified business attire, but a uniform); O'Donnell v. 
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 263, 266 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (employer contends 
requirement that only women wear smocks is not a Title VII violation). But see Harper v. Blockbuster 
Entm't Corp., 1 39 F.3d 1 385, 1 387 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1998) (no Title VII violation found when employer 
enforced hair length policy for male, but not female employees because courts had rejected sex-specific 
grooming policies as violative of Title VU's mandate of equal employment opportunities). 
217.  See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. For Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. v. Norris, 463 
U.S. 1073, 1 074 ( 1983) (Title VII violation found when companies selected to provide retirement 
benefits for employees calculated monthly benefit payments on sex-based mortality tables resulting in 
lower monthly benefits for females than similarly-situated males that contributed equal amounts during 
tenure). 
2 18 .  See L.A. Dep' t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 7 1 2  ( 1 978) (Title VII violation found 
when employer relied on actuarial tables based entirely on sex to require greater contributions from 
female employees); see also Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans 
v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074 ( 1983) (Title VII prohibits an employer from offering its employees option 
of receiving retirement benefits from one of several companies selected by employer, all of which pay a 
woman lower monthly retirement benefits than a man who has made same contributions). 
219 .  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
220. See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Compensation Plans, 463 U.S. at 1081 -82 
( 1983); L.A. Dep't of Water & Power, 435 U.S. at 7 1 1  (policy required a greater contribution from female 
than male employees for the same periodic pension benefits and provided women lesser periodic pension 
benefits than men for equal amounts donated). 
22 1 .  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) (Stating: 
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, 
for an employment agency to classify, or refer for employment any individual, for a labor 
organization to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or 
for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling 
apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in 
any such program, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances 
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise). 
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the burden of persuasion.222 The employer must demonstrate that its discrimina­
tory practice relates to a characteristic that goes to the "essence" of the enterprise 
and bears a high correlation to the plaintiff's capacity to perform her job.223 
ii. Pattern and Practice. In order to prove that an employer's pattern and 
practice of hiring, promotion, or other personnel and employment related 
activities constituted systemic disparate treatment against a protected group, a 
plai n t i ff  must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that sex 
di scri m i nation was the organization's standard operating procedure.224 "Sporadic 
discri m i natory acts" are insufficient to state a Title VII claim.225 
Plaintiffs will often use statistical evidence to demonstrate that the discrimina­
tory action is the employer's standard operating procedure.226 Statistical 
ev idence allows the court to draw an inference that the pattern of adverse actions 
against employees of one sex is the result of discriminatory treatment. If left 
unrchutted, this inference can carry the plaintiff's burden of persuasion.227 
Statistical evidence is useless, however, i f  it lacks a basis for comparison to the 
222.  St·e 29 U.S.C. � 623f (West, WESTLAW through PL. 109-2) (outlines areas where a bona fide 
rn:cupational qualification defense is available). 
223.  W. Air. Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 4 1 6- 1 7  ( 1985). For more on the BFOQ defense, see 
discussion i1!fi·a 1 1 .A.2.  
224.  Set• International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 327, 336-37 (1977) 
f patlcrn an<l practice of discrimination found when African Americans and persons with Spanish 
surnames were rejected from employment or granted less desirable jobs with limited pay and limited 
power to hargain because employer 's reliance on seniority system perpetuated past discrimination); see 
also EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1 286 (1 lth Cir. 2000) (The court stated: 
A pallcrn and practice claim either may be brought by the EEOC if there is reasonable cause to 
hclicvc that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination 
or by a class of private plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. In such suits, the plaintiffs must 
establish that sex discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure. To meet this 
hurden of proof, a plaintiff must prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or accidental 
or sporadic discriminatory acts. It has to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
discrimination is the company's standard operating procedure - the regular rather than unusual 
practice.). 
Hur see EEOC v. High Top Coal Co., 677 F.2d 1 1 36, 1 1 37 (6th Cir. 1 987) (district court rejection of 
pattern and practice discrimination claim not clearly erroneous even though only one of 276 miners was 
female ) .  
225. See lmernational Brotherhood of Teamsters, 43 1 U.S. at 336. 
226. See id. at 339 ("Our cases make it unmistakably clear that statistical analyses have served and 
wil l  cont inue to serve an important role in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed 
issue." ). 
227. Id. at 340 n.20 (statistical evidence of "longstanding and gross disparity" may suffice to make out 
a pri ma facie case of pattern and practice discrimination under Title VII because "absent explanation, it is 
ordinari ly to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more 
or less representative of the racial and ethic composition of the population in the community from which 
cmployees are hired"); see, e.g., EEOC v. Olson's Diary Queens, Inc., 989 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1993) 
f pattern and practice of discrimination claim stated when both statistical and anecdotal evidence pointed 
to racial discrimination in hiring; lower court erred by failing to "fully" consider statistical "applicant 
now" analysis provided by EEOC expert witness). 
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qualified labor pool .228 Therefore plaintiffs must provide an appropriate bench­
mark against which the court may evaluate a statistical disparity.229 While 
anecdotal evidence may strengthen a case evidence of disparate treatment, some 
courts have held that, where the disparities are gross, statistical disparities alone 
may not prove intentional discrimination.230 Plaintiffs do not have to prove 
discrimination with scientific certainty,23 1 however, statistical evidence display­
ing gross disparities in the representation of groups, coupled with anecdotal or 
circumstantial evidence, may establish a discriminatory pattern or practice. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the EEOC allow pattern and practice 
claims to be brought by means of a private class action suit.232 Certification of 
class action status is dependent upon the court's determination that the class 
action is "manageable. "233 Prior to filing a class action suit, however, at least one 
228. See, e.g., Evans v. McClain of Ga., Inc., 1 3 1  F.3d 957, 963 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1997) (no pattern and 
practice of discrimination found when assistant plant manager alleging racial discrimination in being 
passed over for manager position only demonstrated statistical evidence of disproportionately low 
number of African-American supervisory employees without proffering statistical evidence of African­
American applicants for those positions because "statistics without an analytic foundation are 'virtually 
meaningless'"). 
229. See Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp., 89 F.3d 1562, 1 574 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1996) ("Courts should adopt the 
benchmark which most accurately reflects the pool of workers from which promotions are granted unless 
that pool has been skewed by other discriminatory hiring practices."); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701 ,  709 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Where liability depends on a challenge to systemic employment practices-courts have 
required finely tuned statistical evidence, normally demanding a comparison of the employer's relevant 
workforce with the qualified populations in the relevant labor market."). 
230. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States., 433 U.S. 299, 307 ( 1977) ("Where gross statistical 
disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or 
practice of discrimination." (citing International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 
324, 340 n.20 ( 1977))); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 43 1 U.S. at 340 n.20 ("Evidence of 
long-lasting and gross disparity between the composition of a work force and that of the general 
population thus may be significant even though . . .  Title VII imposes no requirement that a work force 
mirror the general population."). "We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite 
variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends on 
all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 4 3 1  U.S. at 340. 
23 1 .  See Bazemore v. United States, 478 U.S. 385, 400 ( 1 986) ("A plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not 
prove discrimination with scientific certainty; rather, his or her burden is to prove discrimination by a 
preponderance of the evidence."). 
232. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 3 1 8, 320 ( 1 980) (EEOC's pattern and practice claim not 
subject to requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23); see, e.g., EEOC v. Mitsubishi Motor Mfg. 
of Am., Inc., 102 F.3d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 1 996) (EEOC intervened in private class action suit brought by 
female employees for hostile environment sexual harassment claim). 
233. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (class action may be maintained when, in addition to fulfillment of Rule 
23(a) requirements, ( I )  proceeding individually would risk inconsistent rulings or earlier rulings would 
preclude later claims; (2) defendant's actions were such that class-wide relief is appropriate, or (3) 
common questions of law predominate); Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1 482 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 987) (The 
court stated: 
As with any private class action, the legitimacy of a private Title VII suit brought on  behalf of a 
class depends upon the satisfaction of two distinct prerequisites. First, there must be an 
individual plaintiff with a cognizable claim, that is, an individual who has constitutional 
standing to raise the claim (or claims) and who has satisfied the procedural requirements of 
Title VII. Second, the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be 
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of the class representatives must exhaust all administrative remedies under Title 
VIl .214 
2. Elements of a Prima Facie Federal Sexual Harassment Case 
a. Unwelcomeness. A plaintiff bringing a sexual harassment suit must first 
prove that the alleged conduct was unwelcome and unsolicited.235 A plaintiff 
must also show that she perceived the conduct as offensive.236 The defendant 
may introduce evidence of the plaintiff's sexual conduct towards the accused 
harasser to demonstrate that the plaintiff welcomed the defendant's behavior if 
1hc evidence is not prejudicial.237 The trier of fact determines unwelcomeness by 
asking whether the plaintiff's conduct indicated that she did not welcome the 
al leged sexual advances, not whether her actual participation in sexual inter­
course was voluntary.238 
h. Because of . . .  Sex Rationale. Title VII requires that sexual harassment 
occur as a result of the victim's sex. The determination is based on whether an 
indiv idual is treated differently in the workplace because of his or her status as a 
man or a woman.239 The critical issue in the "because of sex" inquiry is whether 
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.240 Courts often 
anal yze this element by asking if the harassment would have occurred "but for" 
or "because of' the victim's sex. This standard has been applied in cases of same 
sex sexual harassment,241 and the court has explicitly held that "nothing in Title 
V I I  necessarily bars a claim of discrimination 'because of . . .  sex' merely 
fulfi l led; in other words, the individual plaintiff must be qualified to represent the members of 
the class in accordance with the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a), and the action must be one of 
the three types Rule 23(b) identifies.); 
st'(' also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 1 56, 164 ( 1 974) ("Commonly referred to as 
· manageability, ·  [Rule 23(b)] consideration encompasses the whole range of practical problems that may 
render the class action format inappropriate for a particular suit." Manageability is  a factor in Rule 
Dlh)( 3 )  classes, but is not explicitly supposed to be a factor in Rule 23(b)(l) or Rule 23(b)(2) classes). 
234. See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1968), cited in Calloway v. 
Partners Nat'! Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 450 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 993). 
235. See Meritor Savings Banlc, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) ("The gravamen of any sexual 
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome."). 
236. See id. 
237 
· See EEOC, Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, EEOC Notice No. 915-050 
I 1 990 ); .\'N' also Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 73; FEo R. EVID. 41 2(b)(2) ("[E]vidence offered to 
prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of an alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise 
admissihle under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any 
'ictim and of unfair prejudice to any party."). 
238. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 68. 
239. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5 1 0  U.S. 17, 25 ( 1 993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
_240. Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., 335 F.3d 325, 3 3 1  (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., 523 U.S.  75, 80 (1998)). 
24 1 .  See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 82 ( 1 998). 
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because the plaintiff and the defendant are of the same sex."242 
In Ocheltree v. Scollan Productions, Inc.,243 the defendant employer argued 
that the harassing conduct was not directed towards the plaintiff because of her 
sex, because it was heard by everyone in the shop and equally offensive to some 
of the male employees. 244 The court found that while the harassment was out in 
the open, it was directed at plaintiff employee specifically because she was the 
only woman in the shop.245 Specifically, the court cited that there was no 
evidence that the conduct in question was aimed at embarrassing any of the men 
or that it was calculated to generate laughter at the expense of any man. 246 
3 .  Types of Sexual Harassment 
The terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment" first appeared in 
academic literature and do not actually appear in the statutory text of Title VII. 247 
In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,248 the Court first distinguished between 
quid pro quo and hostile environment claims, holding that both were cognizable 
under Title VIL 249 
a. Quid Pro Quo. 
Employees claiming quid pro quo harassment must demonstrate both that their 
employer took a tangible employment-related action against them250 and that 
they refused their unwelcome sexual advances.25 t To establish a prima facie case 
of quid pro quo sexual harassment, the plaintiff must show that the defendant 
"explicitly or implicitly conditioned a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job 
detriment, upon her acceptance of sexual conduct."252 The court has held that the 
supervisor does not need to be empowered to make the final determination on 
employment decisions for his or her behavior to constitute a quid pro quo action, 
242. Id. at 79. 
243. 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003). 
244. Ocheltree, 335 F.3d at 332. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. See generally, c. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN ( 1 979); Meritor 
Savings Banlc, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 ( 1 986); E. Scalia, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual 
Harassment, 2 1  HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLICY 307 (1989). 
248. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
249. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65; see also Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 
(1998) (discussing history of the development of quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual 
harassment). 
250. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 761 -62 (hiring, firing, failing to promote, and other 
significant changes in the employee's status constitute tangible employment action). 
25 1 .  See, e.g., Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1 305, 1 3 1 2  ( 1 1 th Cir. 200 1 )  (denied 
summary judgment for plaintiff who failed to demonstrate connection between alleged refusal of sexual 
advances and denial of promotion). 
252. Porter v. Cal. Dep't. of Coffections, 383 F.3d 1 018,  1 025 (9th Cir. 2004), quoting Heyne v. 
Caruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1 995). 
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rather the power to make an effective recommendation is enough.253 
h. Hostile Environment. 
A hostile work environment claim consists of five elements: 1 )  the plaintiff 
belongs to a protected group; 2) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual 
harassment; 3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; 4) the 
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment; and 5) her 
employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take 
prompt remedial action. 254 The Supreme Court first recognized the hostile work 
env ironment claim in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.255 In determining 
whether a hostile work environment exists, courts have taken a "totality of the 
<.:i n.:umstances" approach.256 While no single factor is required, courts look to 1) 
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 2) its severity; 3)  whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating as opposed to a mere offensive utterance; 4) 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance; and 5) 
whether the complained-of conduct undermines the plaintiff's workplace compe­
tence. 2�7 
A hostile work environment claim comprises a series of separate acts that 
collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.258 To estab lish a 
hos ti le work environment claim, the plaintiff must show that the harassment was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and 
create a hostile working environment and that the harassing conduct occurred 
hccause of her sex. 259 In order for the harassment to be actionable, the harassing 
conduct must have been "so severely permeated with discriminatory intimida­
tion, ridicule, and insult that the terms and conditions of her employment were 
thereby altered."260 The Court has specifically held that: 
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively 
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reason­
able person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's 
purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the 
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the 
253. See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1 158, 1 1 69 n. 1 4  (9th Cir. 2003) .  
254. Hockman v. Westward Communs., 2004 WL 298035 1 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Amtrak v. 
Morgan. 536 U.S. I O I ,  1 1 6 (2002). 
255. 477 U.S. 57 ( l  986). 
256. Hockman, 2004 WL 298035 1 .  
257. Id. , 2004 WL 298035 1 ,  at *6. 
258. Lyon v. Jones, 260 F.Supp. 2d 507, 5 1 1  (6th Cir. 2004); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)( l) (West, 
WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2). 
259. Lyon, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 5 1 2 (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, 5 10 U.S. 17, 2 1  ( 1 993); Alfano v. 
Costello, 294 F.3d 365,374 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
260. Lyon, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 5 1 2  (citing Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 373 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
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conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title VII 
violation. 261 
65 1 
A single instance of sexual harassment can suffice to prove the existence of a 
hostile work environrnent.262 But as a general rule, incidents must be more than 
episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted to be deemed 
pervasive.263 To determine whether events constitute "one unlawful employment 
practice," courts consider whether they were sufficiently severe or pervasive and 
whether the earlier and later events amounted to the same type of employment 
actions, occurred relatively frequently, or were perpetrated by the same 
managers.264 
4. Employer Defenses 
Section 703(e)( l )  of Title VII allows an employer a defense to policies that 
expressly or facially discriminate on the basis of religion, national origin, or 
gender.265 Additionally, the courts have recognized several defenses for Title VII 
defendants who exercise disparate treatment of employees, including reductions 
in workforce,266 narrowly-tailored affirmative action programs,267 bona fide 
261 .  Lyon, 260 F.Supp. 2d at 5 1 2  (citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, 5 1 0  U.S. 17, 2 1 -22 ( 1 993)). 
262. See Ferris v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 1 36 (2d Cir. 2001 ); see also Brooks v. City of San 
Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 925-27 (9th Cir. 2000). 
263. See Lyon, 260 F.Supp. 2d at 5 12; see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 
(1998) (Title VII does not prohibit "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women 
routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex." Simple teasing, offhand 
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in 
the "terms and conditions of employment." These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently 
demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a "general civility code." Properly applied, they will 
filter out complaints attacking "the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of 
abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing."). 
264. Porter v. Cal. Dep't. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1018 ,  1027-28 (9th Cir. 2004). 
265. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)( l )  (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2) (this provision forbids "an 
employer- '( l )  to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual's . . .  sex.'"). 
266. See, e.g., Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161  F.3d 13 18, 1 3 3 1  ( 1 1th Cir. 1 998) (no Title VII 
violation found when employee failed to meet burden of persuasion because failed to show that RIF 
termination was pretextual), reh'g and reh 'g en bane denied, 187 F.3d 1 287 (1 lth Cir. 1999); Ailor v. 
First State Bank, 940 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1 99 1 )  (unpublished table decision) (no Title VII  violation found 
when, following net loss of $ 58,000, bank terminated male employee based on seniority and female 
employee to cut costs because economic necessity was acceptable justification for RIF termination), 
available at 199 1 WL 150790, at *4. 
267. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 6 1 6, 626 ( 1987) (no Title VII violation found 
when employer considered candidates' sex and promoted female candidate over male plaintiff because 
preferential treatment was pursuant to legitimate affirmative action plan). The plaintiff bears the burden 
of showing that the affirmative action plan is invalid. See id. at 627. A plan is valid when it is 
implemented to correct a manifest imbalance in the workplace and is narrowly tailored in duration and 
scope so as not to unnecessarily infringe upon the rights of non-minorities. See United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 ( 1 979) (no Title VII violation found when preferential treatment was based on 
acceptable affirmative action program adopted as temporary measure to eliminate manifest imbalance in 
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seniority systems, 268 selections based on particular nondiscriminatory qualifica­
tions, 269 and other legitimate business reasons.270 Employers are not allowed, 
however, to discriminate in post-hire terms and conditions of employment 
(compensation, promotion, discipline, harassment, or discharge), or practice any 
discrimination on the basis of race.27 1 
An employer can escape liability for disparate treatment on the basis of sex by 
either showing that she would have reached the same conclusion without 
considering sex, 272 or that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), 
which is reasonably necessary for the normal operation of business.273 The 
former instance limits an employer's liability to injunctive relief and attorneys' 
fees. 274 The latter is limited to situations where the employee's sex interferes with 
her abil ity to perform the j ob.275 An employer must show, however, that its 
discriminatory practice relates to the "essence" of the business and bears a high 
correlation to the plaintiff's capacity to do her job.276 While this defense was 
workfon:e ); .l'l'l' also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 ( 1 989) (Title VII violation 
found when affirmative action program failed to limit scope of injury to non-minorities or duration of 
prowam hccause not sufficiently tailored to remedy past discrimination). 
268. S<'t', e.g . •  Dodd v. Runyon, 1 78 F.3d 1 024, 1 028 (8th Cir. 1 999) (no Title VII violation found 
when fai lure to promote female employee was based on seniority system that precluded clerks from 
advarKing IO position of carrier). 
269. Sel', <'.g .• Arway v. Norwalk Dep't of Police Serv., 1 25 F.3d 843 (2d Cir. 1 997) (unpublished table 
lkrision ) ( no Title VII violation found when male employee was promoted to Chief of Police over female 
l'andidate because she was less qualified), available at 1997 WL 5 89909, at * l ;  Smallwood v. Jefferson 
( 'ounty. 95 F.3d 1 1 5 3  (6th Cir. 1 996) (unpublished table decision) ("desire to hire a more qualified 
appl i1:m11 may constitute a legitimate business reason for a pay differential"), available at 1996 WL 
.t<J0.153. at *4. 
270. In a pattern and practice case, the defendant must show that each employment decision was 
n:a1:hcd. not as a result of a discriminatory policy, but rather for legitimate business reasons subject to 
plaintiff's demonstration that the proffered reasons were pretextual. See International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters v. United States, 43 1 U.S. 324, 362 n.50 ( 1 977) (defendant's justifications were subject to 
further evidence by government that purported reason for applicant's rejection was pretext for unlawful 
discrimination). 
27 1 .  See EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 7 8 1 F.2d 1 362, 1 367 (9th Cir. 1986). 
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) (sex is prohibited as 
motivating factor in employment decisions); id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (prevailing plaintiff limited to 
<lcdaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) when 
employer shows it would have made the same decision absent consideration of protected characteristic). 
273. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 3 2 1 ,  335-37 ( 1977) (Sex-based BFOQ found when 
pla1:ement of females in prison guard position "posed a substantial security problem, directly linked to the 
sex of the prison guard"). 
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2) (sex is prohibited as 
motivating factor in employment decisions); id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (prevailing plaintiff limited to 
dedaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) when 
employer shows it would have made the same decision absent consideration of protected characteristic). 
275. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 1 87, 204 ( 1 99 1 )  (no sex-based BFOQ found when 
discrimination was based on desire to protect female employees' future children, not employees, because 
"permissible distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the job"). 
276. See W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 4 1 7  n.24 ( 1985) (The Court stated: 
An employer asserting a BFOQ defense has the burden of proving that (1)  the age limit is 
reasonably necessary to the essence of the business, and either (2) that all or substantially all 
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thought at the time of its creation to be considerably broad, the Court's decision 
in International Union, U.A. W v. Johnson Controls277 proves that the exception 
is a narrow one. There the Court clarified that the trait the employer targets with 
its discriminatory practice must be not only essential to the business as a whole, 
but also be tied only to the particular job in question.278 The Court did recognize, 
however, that discrimination could be tolerated when the safety of third parties is 
endangered because the employee's gender "actually interferes with the employ­
ee's ability to perform the job."279 
Some courts recognize a narrow BFOQ exception when the employer can 
show that it had reason to believe that its gender-based hiring policy was 
necessary to safeguard legitimate privacy interests of third parties .280 Some 
individuals excluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified, or (3) that some of the 
individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that cannot be ascertained except by 
reference to age. If the employer's objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, 
the employer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate that goal and that 
there is no acceptable alternative which would better advance it or equally advance it with less 
discriminatory impact. 
(citing 46 Fed. Reg. 47727 ( 198 1), C.F.R. § 1 625.6(b) ( 1 984))); see also Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 
Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1 97 1), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 ( 197 1) (the psychological 
reassurance or sexual titillation presumably afforded airline passengers by a requirement that flight 
attendants be female could not excuse discriminating against males once the court defined the essence of 
the business as safe transportation rather than maximum profit); Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 
228, 234 (5th Cir. 1 969) (even if discriminating against a protected group is intended to improve the 
operation of a function crucial to the enterprise, the employer's evidence must show that "all or 
substantially all" members of the protected group lack the required characteristic and would thus be 
unable to sufficiently perform that function). 
277. 499 U.S. 1 87, 206 ( 1991) (employer's rule barred all still-fertile women of any age, marital 
status, or child-bearing inclination from holding a position in which they would be likely to be 
susceptible to lead exposure that endangered the health of a fetus they might be carrying. The Court 
rejected the defense because, according to the record, "Fertile women . . .  participate in the manufacture 
of batteries as efficiently as anyone else."). 
278. See id. at 20 1 (the defense fails unless the defendant demonstrates objectively that the 
discrimination is not only "reasonably necessary" to the "normal operation" of the "particular" business 
but also relates to "job-related skills and aptitudes"). Some courts require the employer to show that there 
were no available alternatives to the discrimination. See, e.g., Reed v. County of Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 600 
(6th Cir. 1 999) (sex-based BFOQ found when state law required presence of female prison guard when 
female prisoner was lodged in jail and transfer of female employee from first to third shift justified when 
no effective alternative existed due to logistical complications and unpredictability of need); Chambers v. 
Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 704-05 (8th Cir. 1987) (sex-based BFOQ found when employer 
terminated unmarried, pregnant female employee because primary purpose of organization was to serve 
as role model for teenage girls and employee's contact with girls was inevitable). 
279. See International Union, U.A. W, 499 U.S. at 204. Compare Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 ,  
322 (1 997) (sex-based BFOQ found when position of  prison guard entailed significant contact with male 
sex offenders in maximum security prison because placement of women in those jobs would "pose a 
substantial security problem, directly linked to the sex of the prison guard"), with International Union, 
U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.  1 87,  204 ( 1991) (no sex based BFOQ found when defendant 
discriminated against fertile women from jobs involving actual or potential or actual lead exposure to 
prevent birth defects because policy was not enacted to protect health of employees, but rather to protect 
health of unborn children). 
280. See Olsen v.
_
Marriott lnt' l ,  Inc, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1069 (D. Ariz. 1 999) (privacy-based BFOQ 
two-factor test required defendant to show that: ( 1) "legitimate privacy rights of patients, clients, or 
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courts require that the defendant show that there were no available alternatives to 
the discrimination.281  
In the case of systemic disparate treatment, the employer 's defense must be 
"designed to meet the prima facie case" established by plaintiff's statistical proof, 
the focus of its rebuttal case likewise "will not be on individual employment 
dccisions."282 Instead, to meet its rebuttal burden, the employer must demon­
strate that the plaintiff's statistical evidence "is either inaccurate or insignifi­
cant. "210 
Employers can implement affirmative action programs to counter past 
discri mi nation and use those programs as a defense against discriminatory 
practices. The Court has held that an employer can lawfully take race into 
account in preferring African-American employees as a group for admission to 
an on-the-job training program.284 Likewise, employers may take gender into 
account to address the problem of the under-representation of women in the 
workforce. The employer must demonstrate that the affirmative action plan 
re flects the imbalances caused by past discrimination i n  the workplace,285 and the 
plai nt iff bears the burden of proving that the affirmative action plan violates Title 
V I I .  
I n  Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,286 the Court rejected the view that 
employers are always automatically liable for sexual harassment by their 
su pervisors. 287 The Court realized, however, that the appellate courts struggled in 
the wake of the Meritor decision to find manageable standards to govern 
inm;ues would be violated by hiring members of one sex to fill  the position at issue" ; and (2) "there are no 
'reasonable alternatives to a sex-based policy" (quoting Hernandez v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 
2 1 4. 2 1 6 (D. Minn. 1 992))); Jennings v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 380-81 
( S.D.N. Y. 1992) (privacy-based BFOQ three-factor test required defendant to show that: ( l )  it had 
"fac1ual basis for believing that it i s  necessary" to employ person of particular sex in position to 
"protected the privacy interests" of third party; (2) third party's "privacy interest if entitled to protection 
under the law"; and (3) "no reasonable alternatives exist to protect those interests other than the gender 
hased hiring policy"), aff'd, 977 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 
281. See, e.g., Reed v. County of Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir. 1999) (sex-based BFOQ found 
when state law required presence of female prison guard when female prisoner was lodged in jail and 
transfer of female employee from first to third shift justified when no effective alternative existed due to 
logistical complications and unpredictability of need); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 
697. 704-705 (8th Cir. 1 987) (sex-based BFOQ found when employer terminated unmarried, pregnant 
female employee because primary purpose of organization was to serve as role model for teenage girls 
and employee's contact with girls was inevitable). 
2ll2. Beck v. Boeing Co. 60 Fed. Appx. 38, 4 (9th Cir. 2003). 
283. Id. 
284. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 1 93 ,  209 (1979). 
285. See. e.g. , id. at 208 (Title VII does not prohibit race-conscious affinnative action policies by 
private sector employers taking steps to eradicate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated 
joh categories); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640 (1987) (agency was allowed to take 
the employee's sex into account in determining her eligibility for promotion, as part of an affirmative 
action plan for gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women in the agency's work 
force). 
286. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
287. Id. at 73. 
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employer liability for a hostile work environment created by supervisory 
employees.288 The Court resolved this issue in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton289 
and Burlington Industrial v. Ellerth290 by holding that vicarious liability was the 
appropriate standard for supervisory hostile work environment harassment.291 
In Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 292 the key issue before the Court was 
whether an employer would be held strictly liable for a supervisor's conduct. The 
Court found that Title VII holds employers liable for constructive discharge, but 
that an e mployer is not always strictly liable.293 With regard to constructive 
discharge, the Court's ruling in Suders impacts the available employer defenses. 
The Court made a distinction between a constructive discharge that is attributable 
to a supervisor 's official conduct and one that is attributable to a supervisor's 
unofficial conduct. If no official conduct is involved in the constructive 
discharge, the employer may defend against such a claim by showing both: 1 )  
that it had installed a readily accessible and effective policy for reporting and 
resolving complaints of sexual harassment, and 2) that the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to avail herself of that employer-provided preventive or remedial 
apparatus.294 This affirmative defense is not available to the employer, however, 
if the plaintiff quits in reasonable response to an employer-sanctioned adverse 
action officially changing her employment status or situation, for example, a 
humiliating demotion, extreme cut in pay, or transfer to a position in which she 
288. Goldsmith, supra note 1 92. 
289. 524 U.S. 775 ( 1 998). 
290. 524 U.S. 742 ( 1 998). 
291 .  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 ( 1 998) (''We hold that an employer is 
vicariously l iable for actionable discrimination caused by a supervisor, but subject to an affirmative 
defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer's conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim."); 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.  742, 765 ( 1 998). The Court stated: 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile 
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the 
employee. When no tangible employment action is taken. a defending employer may raise an 
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing beha;ior, and (b) that 
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any prevent�ve or. corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise . .  ." . No affirm
ative defense 
is available, however, when the supervisor's harassment culminates 111 a tangible employment 
action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. 
Id. 
292. 542 U.S.  1 29 (2004). 
293. Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 1 29, 2 1 6  (2004) (The Court stated: 
We conclude that an employer does not have recourse to the Ellcrth/Faragher affii:m
_
ative 
defense (which otherwise applies strict liability) when a supervisor's official act prec1p1tat�s 
the constructive discharge; absent such a tangible employment action. however, the defense is 
available to the employer whose supervisors are charged with harassment. We therefore vacate 
the Third Circuit's judgment and remand the case for further procecdmgs. ). 
294. Suders, 542 U.S. at 2 1 2. 
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would face unbearable working conditions.295 The Court also commented that if 
the hostile work environment leads to a tangible employment action against the 
employee, such as a reduction in pay, the employer cannot pursue the affirmative 
defense. 296 
5. Pretext 
After the defendant employer has presented specific, non discriminatory 
reasons for his conduct in a sex discrimination case, the plaintiff has the burden 
of rebutting the employer's evidence of a non discriminatory motive. If the 
employer meets the burden of articulating a legitimate, non discriminatory 
motive. the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff 
can still prove disparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence demonstrat­
ing that the employer's explanation is pretexual.297 
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,298 the Court explained that 
the jury may find the ultimate fact of discrimination on a prohibited ground from 
I )  evidence making out a prima facie case, along with 2) "sufficient" evidence 
that the employer's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation is 
false . 299 
When an employer asserts that he failed to hire an employee due to her lack of 
qua l i fications, a comparative analysis of other applicants for the same job may 
help i n  proving pretext. 300 The defendant can escape liability, however, if it 
chooses an equally qualified applicant over another, barring any evidence of an 
unl awful motive.30 1 A showing of pretext is not just limited to final or formal 
decision makers ; persons with actual, but not formal, decision-making authority 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 50 n.3 (2003) (The Court stated: 
The Court in McDonnell Douglas set forth a burden-shifting scheme for discriminatory­
treatment cases. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina­
tory reason for its employment action. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of 
intentional discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by, for 
instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the employer's explanation is pretextual.). 
298. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
299. Id. at 147 ("The fact finder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant, together with 
the elements of the prima facie case, may suffice to show intentional discrimination [and a] rejection- of 
the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional 
discrimination") (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 5 1 1  (1993)). 
:mo. See Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1 30 1 ,  1 3 1 9  ( 10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sanchez 
v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1 993)) . 
. 
.\CH . See id. at 1 3 1 9  (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248-259 (1981)). The 
differences between an unsuccessful candidate and a successful candidate must be "overwhelming" to be 
ad mine� as evidence of pretext. Id. at 1 3 1 9 (quoting Sanchez v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 992 F.2d 244, 247-48 
< I  0th Cir. 1 993)); see, e.g., Bullington, 1 86 F.3d at 1 3 1 9  (plaintiff alleged that other male applicants who 
had sa�e q�alifications as she were hired for position she applied for and as such, United Air Lines was 
d1scnmmatmg against her because she was, among other things, a woman). 
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can serve as the basis for proof that discrimination motivated the employment 
decision. 302 
6. Plaintiff 's Ultimate Burden of Persuasion 
The primary inquiry as to whether a claimant established a prima facie case 
loses all importance once the defendant presents its proof. After both sides have 
presented their cases, the jury has to evaluate all admitted evidence, including, 
but not limited to, the plaintiff 's prima facie evidence to determine whether the 
plaintiff carried the ultimate burden of persuasion.303 A plaintiff has met her 
burden of persuasion once she presents: I) a strong prima facie case and 2) 
evidence that the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory motives for commit­
ting the unlawful discriminatory practice are untrue. 
B. DISPARATE IMPACT 
Compared to the widely used disparate treatment theory, Title VII plaintiffs 
bring claims under the disparate impact theory much less frequently.304 A Title 
VII plaintiff invokes the disparate impact theory when asserting that a facially 
neutral policy has a disproportionately adverse impact on a protected class. A 
plaintiff alleging disparate impact does not have to show that the respondent 
acted with discriminatory intent, because the purpose of the theory is to thwart 
practices that disproportionately impact members of a protected class, where the 
employer did not purposefully discriminate. 305 A complainant can invoke the 
302. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 314 F.3d 657, 668 (4th Cir. 2003) (The court 
stated: 
In pretext cases our court and most other courts of appeals have rejected the view that the only 
relevant decision makers are those with final or formal authority. These pretext cases support 
the proposition that the discriminatory attitude of someone who is an actual, but not a fonnal, 
decision maker may prove that discrimination motivated the employment decision.). 
303. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146 (2000) ("The ultimate question is 
whether the employer intentionally discriminated"). Once the defendant fails to persuade the court to 
grant a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff's case, and 
defendant has offered evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the court should address the 
ultimate discrimination vel non, and the question whether the claimant established a prima facie case is 
no longer significant. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7 1 1 ,  716 ( 1 983). 
304. See, e.g., Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: Whats 
Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597 (2004)("Griggs and the disparate impact theory 
of litigation remain largely untapped resources of enonnous potential for plaintiffs."); see also Nichole J. 
Desario, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate Impact Discrimination Law, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 479, 480 (2003) ("Courts have chipped away at the premises of the disparate 
impact doctrine . . .  This dilution of the disparate impact doctrine is troubling in a society in which many 
practices that disproportionately harm a protected class cannot neatly be traced to intentional 
discrimination."). 
305. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 40 1 U.S. 424, 43 1 (197 1 ); cf Candelario-Ramos v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp. ,  360 F.3d 53, 62 ( 1 st Cir. 2004) ("[A]n employer who provides different levels of 
compensation for employees pursuant to a bona fide seniority system cannot be held liable under . . .  
disparate impact . . .  [because] plaintiffs must prove an intent to discriminate."). 
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disparate impact theory to combat objective policies, such as standardized test 
scores, 306 and subjective policies, such as decision makers' beliefs, 307 that 
disproportionately affect the plaintiff's protected class.308 Disparate impact is 
regarded as an effective mechanism useful in eradicating employment policies 
that l im it (prospective) employee opportunity.309 The theory has regularly been 
used to challenge height and weight requirements that disproportionately affect 
members of a protected class. 
I .  Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case and Employer's Defenses 
A plaintiff alleging that her employer's policies disparately impact her 
protected class must only show that a "significantly discriminatory pattern" 
results from the employer's facially neutral policies.310 Then the defendant 
employer bears the burden of demonstrating that the contested policy has "a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question."3 1 1  If the employer can 
demonstrate that its business necessitates the policy or that the contested policy 
relates to the defendant's business, then a court may uphold the policy; in making 
such demonstration, the employer assumes the burden of production and 
pcrsuasion. 3 1 2  If the defendant employer makes such a showing, then to prevail, 
the plaintiff must show that other policies are available and the policies 1 )  do not 
simi larly adversely impact the plaintiff, and 2) "serve the employer's legitimate 
interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship."31 3  
2 .  Plaintiff Reliance o n  Statistical Evidence 
In m aking a prima facie case, a plaintiff does not have to use all available 
306. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 ( 1 982) (Court found that a standardized test requisite 
to ac4uire supervisor status disproportionately impacted African American applicants). 
307. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 ( 1988) (Court found that the 
suhjccti ve views of individuals in a supervisory role may buttress disparate impact claims). 
308. See id. 
309. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 43 1 .  
3 1 0. 4 2  U.S .C. § 2000e-(k)( l )(A) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 1 09-2); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. 
at 430: Teal, 457 at 446 (plaintiff, as a member of a protected class, must shows that a facially neutral 
employment practice significantly disproportionately impacted her as a member of such class). 
3 1 1 .  Griggs, 40 1 U.S.  at 432. 
3 1 2 . See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l )(A)(i) (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2), amended by Civil 
Rights Act of 1 991 ,  Pub. L. No. 1 02- 1 66, § 105(a), 1 05 Stat. 107 1  ( 1 99 1 ). 
3 1 3 . Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 4 1 1 U.S. 792, 801 ( 1 973) (The Court stated: 
This burden arises, of course, only after the complaining party or class has made out a prima 
facie case of discrimination, i.e., has shown that the tests in question select applicants for hire 
or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants . . . .  If 
an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are 'job related,' it remains open 
to the complaining party to show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly 
undesirable racial effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and 
trustworthy workmanship' . . . .  Such a showing would be evidence that the employer was 
using its tests merely as a 'pretext' for discrimination . . . .  In the present case, however, we are 
concerned only with the question whether Albemarle has shown its tests to be job-related.)). 
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evidence, but rather only evidence that "conspicuously demonstrates a job 
requirement's grossly discriminatory impact. "3 14 As the disparate impact theory 
relies heavily on employment policies' effects on individuals who belong to a 
protected class, plaintiffs invoking the disparate impact theory often use 
statistical evidence to buttress their claims.3 15  When using statistical evidence to 
show a policy disparately impacted hiring, a plaintiff's evidence will not suffice if 
she only compares members of the plaintiff's protected class to individuals who 
do not belong to the plaintiff's protected class.3 1 6  Additionally, a plaintiff must 1)  
proffer evidence comparing the proportion of protected class members that 
applied for the contested position or similar positions to the proportion of class 
members who received the position and 2) show how that data compares to 
corresponding data of non-class members. 3 1 7  A complainant must also identify a 
nexus between the allegedly discriminatory practices and the statistical dispari­
ties evident in proffered data. 3 1 8  Statistical evidence need not incorporate all 
variables that may affect the outcome of a statistical analysis supporting a 
plaintiff's disparate impact claim.3 19 However, if relevant statistical analysis 
lacks several substantial variables, then courts may find the analysis insufficient 
to sustain a disparate impact claim. 320 
C. GENDER NEUTRALITY, RACE, AND HETEROSEXISM: CHALLENGES FOR TITLE VII 
From the beginning, Title VII policy and jurisprudence has been challenged by 
the realities of its normative concern for resolving difference and power 
associated conflicts within a white, heterosexist context. The law has traditionally 
conceived of gender identity in terms of heterosexual white women and racial 
314. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (plaintiff proffered enough evidence to show 
that defendant employer's height and weight requirements disparately impacted women in violation of 
Title VU). 
315. See generally B.  SCHLEI & P. GROSMMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 91-92, 1389 (2d 
ed. 1983). 
316. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Though Congress expanded the 
interpretation of the disparate impact doctrine in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Ward Cove still sufficiently 
describes the proof required to make a disparate impact showing. However, a plaintiff cannot use 
disparate impact to invalidate a §2000e-2(h) "bona fide seniority system" that allocates differing 
compensation based upon employees' seniority ; the plaintiff must instead invoke the disparate treatment 
doctrine. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 ( 1 982). 
317. See Ward Cove, 490 U.S. at 642; see also Foster, 98 Fed. Appx. at 85. 
318. Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 ( 1 988). 
319. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986). 
320. See Sandoval v. Boulder, 388 F.3d 1312, 1326 (Colo. 2004) (A "conclusory observation that . . .  
agencies . . .  employ minorities and women in their upper ranks does not constitute ' statistical evidence' 
that . . .  challenged hiring practices systematically disadvantaged minorities and ".'om�n.''.); cf �ooper v. 
S. Co., Ga. Power Co., 390 F.3d 695, 717-18 ( l  l th Cir. 2004). In a Title VII racial d1scnmmat1on case, 
after assessing the adequacy of the plaintiff's statistical report proffered to establish that employer's 
policies disparately impacted African-Americans, the court affirmed the district court's .finding� that 
evidence presented did not establish discrimination. Id. The c�urt noted the lack of d1fferen_
tia
_
t10,n 
between types of positions, locations of the plaintiffs, and pohc�es o_
f 
_
departments and the plamt1ff s 
failure to identify a policy or practice responsible for the alleged disparities. Id. 
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identity in terms of heterosexual black men. Through this narrow and single-axis 
framework the experiences and perspectives of women of color, homosexuals, 
and transgendered persons are muted, if considered at all. When considering the 
experiences of women of color and the growing reality of same sex sexual 
harassment, the manner in which courts decide cases increasingly requires the 
consideration of multiple and varied structures and experiences of subordination. 
I . The Gender Neutral Approach and the Reasonable Woman Standard 
The reasonable person standard is a foundational theory of American tort law; 
courts have often referred to a hypothetical person's behavior to measure what 
conduct is reasonable and what is unreasonable. 32 1 Courts first establish that 
Americans have a duty to act with reasonable and ordinary care and then evaluate 
i f  the particular plaintiffs and defendants have conducted themselves in such a 
manner.322 After the Supreme Court established the sexual harassment claim 
under Title VII, courts have evaluated plaintiffs' cases by asking if a reasonable 
person would view the workplace in question as hostile. 323 
As with other areas of tort law, courts have applied more specific standards 
than the reasonable person standard when dealing with instances of mental 
incompetence, children, and other extraordinary cases.324 These situations reveal 
the flaws in the belief in a "neutral" or "objective" standard that is not contingent 
on a particular experience or perspective. With respect to sexual harassment law, 
the reasonable woman standard is inadequate to the extent that it assumes a 
monol ithic perspective on the experiences of women across race, class, and 
religious differences in confronting gender discrimination in the workplace.325 
The "reasonable person" standard does not take into account the differences 
32 1 .  See. e.g., Bethel v. N.Y. City Transit Auth. ,  703 N.E.2d 1 214, 1 2 1 6  (N.Y. 1 998) (defendant was 
held to the ordinary standard of care instead of the heightened standard for a common carrier when its 
faulty hus seat caused plaintiff's injury); see also Estate of Lepage v. Home, 809 A.2d 505, 5 1 1  (Conn. 
2002 l (appropriate inquiry was whether a daycare provider fulfilled her duty of care to a baby who died of 
sudden infant death syndrome). 
322. See, e.g., Gordon v. Am. Museum of Natural History, 492 N.E. 2d 774 (N.Y. 1986) (museum was 
not liable for violating the standard of care because it did not have constructive notice of a slip of paper 
1hat caused the plaintiff to fall and injure himself). 
323. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 ( 1 998) (to prevail on a hostile 
environment claim, the alleged harassment "must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that 
a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so."). 
_\24. See Roberts v. Ramsbottom, l All E. R. 7 (Q.B.D. 1 979) (defendant suffered stroke while driving 
hut proceeded behind the wheel and was held liable for the damage caused by an ensuing crash; his 
argument that he should be judged by a different standard for those with impaired facilities was 
dismissed); Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 ( 1 837) (defendant was held liable for piling hay on 
his own property despite warnings that it was a fire hazard when a blaze burned down his neighbor's 
house ). But see Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Wisc. 1996) (mentally 
impaired individual's incapacity was taken into account in determining the appropriate standard of care); 
Lcmuth v. Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 348 P.2d 887, 894 (Cal. 1 960) (upheld jury instructions 
specifying that children should be held to a different standard of care than adults) . 
325. See generally, Meri 0. Triades, Article: Finding a Hostile Work Environment: The Searchfor a 
Reasonable Reasonableness Standard, 8 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L. J. 35 (2002). 
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between how men and women experience sexual behavior.326 Women are more 
often the victims of sexual violence and rape, therefore conduct that may not 
offend a man may offend a woman. This fundamental difference in world view 
alters the manner in which basic communication is interpreted and relationships 
are managed. 
The "reasonable woman" standard was first used in a dissent in Rabidue v. 
Osceola Re.fining Company.327 The Ninth Circuit agreed, adopting the "reason­
able woman" standard because "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to 
be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women . . .  
[a] gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment enables women to 
participate in the workplace on an equal footing with men."328 
The "reasonable woman" standard is best explained through "differences 
feminism or cultural feminism." According to this theory, law should promulgate 
an "acceptance theory" embracing the differences between the sexes.329 Cultural 
feminist would note that the "reasonable person" standard is  in actuality a 
"reasonable man" standard that purports to embrace both sexes but is actually 
only based on the male baseline of appropriate behavior. 330 The evolution of this 
thinking is evident in the legal theory of Justice Ginsberg, who i n  United States v. 
Virginia33 1 revealed the evolution of her thinking on the recognition of gender 
differences in the law. 332 While previously unsupportive of laws recognizing 
gender differences, 333 Justice Ginsberg's opinion stated, "inherent differences 
between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for 
celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial 
326. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1 99 1 ) (The court stated: 
We believe that in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should 
focus on the perspective of the victim. If we only examined whether a reasonable person would 
engage in allegedl y  harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level 
of discrimination. Harassers could continue to harass merely hecausc a particular discrimina­
tory practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no remedy. We therefore 
prefer to analyze harassment from the victim"s perspective. A complete understanding of the 
victim's view requires, among other things. an analysis of the differcnl perspectives of men and 
women. Conduct that many men consider unobjectionahle may offend many women.). 
327. 805 F.2d 6 1 1 (6th Cir. 1 986) (C.J. Keith dissenting: 
I would have courts adopt the perspective of the reasonahle victim which simultaneously 
allows courts to consider salient sociological differences as well as shield employers from the 
neurotic complainant. Moreover, unless the outlook of the reasonable woman is adopted, the 
defendants as well as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrai ned notions of reasonable 
behavior fashioned by the offenders, in this case, men. ) .  
328. See Ellison v .  Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1 99 1 )  (court upheld employee's claim against a 
man who sent her letters with sexual content because a reasonable woman would find such 
correspondence objectionable). 
329. See generally, ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE ( 1 997). 
330. See generally, CAROL GILLIAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE ( 1 983 ). 
33 1 .  5 1 8  U.S. 5 1 5  ( 1 996). 
332. Id. at 554. 
l 975) 333. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Gender and the Co11stiturio11. 44 U. C!N. L. REV. I ( · 
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constraints on an individual's opportunity."334 She goes on to observe a 
reparative framework for gender justice, stating that sex differences can be used 
to compensate women who have suffered economic disadvantages and to 
promote equal employment opportunities.335 While education and employment 
are di fferent fields, Ginsberg's comments in Virginia indicate the promise that a 
more gender-conscious jurisprudence lies ahead in all fields of law. 
The "reasonable woman" standard may hinder the cause of gender justice by 
rcifying long held and deeply seated stereotypes about the differences between 
the genders.336 "Formal" or "liberal" feminists hold the view that women are like 
men in the ways that matter to the state and should be treated accordingly.337 This 
view holds that the male standard is, in fact, neutral or will become so in time.338 
This view has made its way into Supreme Court decisions.339 
2. The Intersection of Race and Gender 
Courts have recognized the interaction of multiple sources of discriminatory 
an imus when considering the claims of women of color.340 Some courts 
aggregate evidence of racial hostility with evidence of sexual hostility while 
others deal with an adverse employment action based on two or more grounds 
scparately.34 1 The experiences of women of color, and black women in particular, 
in bri nging Title VII discrimination claims based on race and sex have been 
dassi tied as "sex-plus" and a discrimination claim from a subclass of women 
cannot be undermined by a showing of non-discriminatory treatment towards the 
respective disaggregated classes of the subclass .342 While the "sex-plus" 
framework recognizes the unique discrimination black women face in the 
workplace, it fails to recognize the indivisible nature of the discrimination caused 
by their gender status and the discrimination caused by their racial status. These 
identities are not severable or stackable, but rather they are experienced 
simultaneously. 
334. Vir}?inia, 5 1 8  U.S. at 533. 
335. Id. at 533. 
336. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 244 (1999); see also 
Ginsburg. supra note 333 (gender distinctions harm women). 
337. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 809 (2002);  see generally, WFST, 
mpra note 329. 
338. See HOOKS, supra note 337; see generally, WEST, supra note 329. 
339. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 1 90, 199 ( 1976) (legislatures should adopt sex-neutral substantive 
laws: sex-based distinctions, such as the one in the Oklahoma statute imposing a different drinking age 
for hoys than for girls, are unconstitutional); see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 7 1 ,  75-76 (1971) 
I invalidating sex and gender distinctions in the law). 
340. See Mccowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 925 n.9 ( 1 0th Cir. 2001 ). 
34 1 .  Compare Harrington v. Cleburne County Bd. of Educ., 25 1 F.3d 935-37 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2001)  with 
McGowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 91 7, 925 n.9 ( 10th Cir. 2001 )  . 
. "\42. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris County Cmty. Action Ass'n, 6 1 5  F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980) 
< when Title VII plaintiff alleges that employer discriminates against black females, fact that black males 
and white females are not subject to discrimination is irrelevant and must not form any part of the basis 
for a finding that employer did not discriminate against black female plaintiff). 
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In Degraffenreid v. General Motors,343 five African-American women brought 
suit against General Motors, alleging that the employer's seniority system 
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination against black women. While 
General Motors did not hire black women prior to 1964, the court noted that 
General Motors hired female employees for a number of years prior to the 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964. 344 The fact that General Motors hired 
only white women did not matter to the court in evaluating the General Motors' 
system of seniority. The court was unable to imagine that black women could 
have experiences separate and uniquely different from those of white women or 
black men. 345 This oversight frames the expansion of Title VII j urisprudence that 
the "sex-plus" framework strives to achieve. 
The complexities of j oint racial and gender classification are not just the 
problems of black women. While not traditionally thought to be the concern of 
Title VII, black men have also faced specific and unique discrimination in 
employment settings. The statistical evidence of black male experiences in the 
labor market proves that black men do not share in the privileges of maleness 
enjoyed by their white counterparts.346 While each component of the black 
women's subjugation is commonly recognized as a protected class, the unique 
social position of black men is hard to conceptualize. When blackness is 
343. De Graffenreid v. GM Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977). 
344. Id. at 483 (The court stated: 
GM was free of unlawful discrimination against women in its hiring, seniority, and layoff 
policies for the following reasons: ( 1 )  GM's reliance on provisions of Missouri law relating to 
employment of women insulated it from charges of sex discrimination; (2) GM's seniority 
system did not perpetuate past discrimination because GM had hired female workers before the 
effective date of Title VII; and (3) assertions by plaintiffs that GM's illegal employment 
practices actually deterred several plaintiffs from applying for employment between 1965 and 
1967, amount to "conclusory allegations" which cannot support a valid claim to constructive 
seniority or other relief under Title VII.); 
see also Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in DAVID 
KAIRYS, ED., THE POLrflCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 356-57 ( 1 998). 
345. See Degraffenreid v. GM Assembly Div., 4 1 3  F. Supp. 142, 1 45 (E.D. Mo. 1 976). 
As the Court has stated above, counsel for plaintiffs, and the Court's own research, have failed 
to discover any case holdings which allow the creation of a new sub-category within Title VII 
that would generate such a new protected class of minorities. The legislative history 
surrounding Title Vil does not indicate that the goal of the statute was to create a new 
classification of "black women" who would have greater standing than, for example, a black 
male. The prospect of the creation of new classes of protected minorities, governed only by the 
mathematical principles of permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of opening 
the hackneyed Pandora's box. 
Id. For a more in-depth discussion of the implications of this and other decisions on the construction of 
black women's identity in the courts, see Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in DAVID KAIRYS, ED., THE Pouncs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE 
CRITIQUE 356-57 ( 1998). . 
346. See, e.g., Kenneth Couch & Mary C. Daley, Improving the Relative Status of Black Men, workmg 
paper (January 2004) (In 2001 the average younger black earned 86% as much as his equally experienced 
white counterpart. Black men as a whole earn 72% the wages of white men as a whole). 
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combined with maleness, black men are completely separated from white men in 
the labor market. 347 
Few Title VII cases have recognized the unique status of black men. In 
Jolm.wm v. Memphis Police Department,348 the court found for a plaintiff who 
complained that the department's no beard policy discriminated against many 
black men who, unlike white men, suffer from a skin condition that makes it 
unhealthy to shave every day.349 In Robinson v. Adams,350 however, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the argument that a black man had established a prima facie case 
of sex-and-race discrimination. 351 In light of cases like these a "race-plus" 
framework has been proposed for helping courts comprehend the unique 
discrimination faced by black men.352 Furthermore, such a framework may help 
illustrate that black men need not establish that their grievance is one common to 
all black individuals working for a particular employer, but rather that the fact 
that they are black and male, they have been singled out for prejudice.353 
3.  Same-Sex Sexual Harassment 
Sexual harassment law traditionally has been concerned with interactions 
between men and women in the workplace. A growing number of sexual 
harassment cases, however, occur between members of the same sex. Title VII 
does not recognize sexual orientation as a classification and discrimination based 
on sexual orientation is not actionable under Title VIl.354 While the Supreme 
Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services355 held that same-sex sexual 
harassment is an actionable claim under Title VII, the Court's language did not 
resolve how plaintiffs alleging same-sex sexual harassment prove that the 
conduct was "because of sex. "356 Consequently, the lower courts employ 
di ffering and conflicting methods of analysis to determine when and under what 
347. See, e.g., Jesse B. Semple, Note: Invisible Man: Black and Male Under Title VII, 1 04 HARV. L. 
REV. 749 ( 1 99 1 ). 
348. 7 1 3  F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Tenn. 1989). 
349. Id. at 245. 
350. 84 7 F.2d 13 1 5  (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 490 U .S. 1105 (1989). 
35 1 .  Id. at (The Court stated: 
Conceivably, the absence of any black male employees could result from racial stereotyping or 
have some other link to racial discrimination . . . [The plaintiff's] showing that black males are 
statistically underrepresented cannot, standing alone, show a racially discriminatory impact 
when there is clearly no racially discriminatory impact on blacks as a whole.) . 
. l52. See Semple, supra note 347, at 765-67. 
353. Id. 
354. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2); see also A llen v. Mineral Fiber 
Specialists. 2004 WL 23 1 293 (E.D. P a. 2004). 
355. 523 U.S. 75 ( 1 998). 
356. See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1 998). For a more 
in-depth discussion of the Oncale decision, see Matthew Fedor, Comment, Can Price Waterhouse and 
Gender Stereotyping Save the Day For Same-Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Under Title VII? A Careful 
Reading of Oncale Compels an Affirmative Answer, 3 2  SETON HALL L. REv. 455 (2002). 
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circumstances plaintiffs alleging same-sex sexual harassment have a valid 
claim.357 
The Court articulated in Oncale that a plaintiff alleging same-sex sexual 
harassment must prove that the discrimination was not just tinged with offensive 
sexual connotations, but that it actually constituted discrimi nation "because of 
sex."358 Prior to Oncale, the Court ruled on gender stereotyping in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.359 In Price Waterhouse, the Court stated:  
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day 
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting 
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for in 
forbidding employers to discriminate agai nst individuals because of 
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes. 360 
The Court did not mention Price Waterhouse in Oncale. They have also 
declined to hear lower court cases dealing with same-sex sexual harassment since 
Oncale, leaving the lower courts with little guidance. Consequently, a number of 
conflicting approaches to addressing same-sex sexual harassment have been 
used. For instance, in James v. Platte River Steel Ca.;16 1 the court held that the 
Oncale decision's finding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under 
Title VII specifically dealt with same-sex sexual harassment tied to gender 
discrimination and that since James could not show that the harassment he faced 
was "because of. . .  sex," he did not have a n  actionable claim under Title VII.362 
Circuit court splits have left same-sex sexual harassment an unresolved issue. 
The perspective of the lower courts fal l into four categories: I )  courts that 
overlook Price Waterhouse and take a restrictive view of the meaning of "sex," 2) 
courts that equate gender stereotyping with sexual orientation discrimination, 3 )  
courts that recognize a gender stereotyping cause of action under Title VII but 
357. See generally Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Company, 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 200 1 ) ; 
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 200 I ) ; Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d I 080 
(7th Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252 ( I  st Cir. 1 999). 
358. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 8 1. 
359. 490 U.S. 228 ( 1 989). 
360. Id. at 251 (quotations omitted). 
36 1 .  1 1 3 Fed. Appx. 864, 2004 WL 2378778 ( 1 0th Cir. 2004). 
362. Id. (The court stated: 
[Plaintiff's] arguments are without merit. Regardless of whether Platte River has a history of 
employing male employees who sexually harass other male employees, [plaintiff) mus� sti!l 
establish that he was personally discriminated against because of his gender . . .  while 11 
certainly appears that the general work atmosphere at Platte River was awash with childish and 
boorish behavior, (plaintiff) failed to put forth sufficient admissible evidence to establish, under 
Oncale, that he was unlawfully discriminated against "because of sex" based on the general 
work atmosphere at Platte River. We therefore reject (plaintiff)'s claim that the district court 
erred by failing to consider other alleged incidents of male-on-male sexual harassment 
involving other Platte River employees.). 
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deny the particular claim and 4) courts that recognize a gender stereotyping cause 
of action under Title VII but affirm the claim.363 The Supreme Court has denied 
certiorari in many of the cases that fall into these categories. 364 
In Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Company, 365 the court recognized 
three ways in which a plaintiff can demonstrate that same-sex sexual harassment 
amounted to discrimination because of sex: the harasser was motivated by sexual 
desire, expressing hostility to the presence of a particular sex in the workplace, or 
acting to punish the victim's noncompliance with gender stereotypes.366 Other 
courts have used this framework to analyze same-sex sexual harassment cases 
and sti l l  found the evidence insufficient to support the claim. 
The issues presented by the transformation of popular attitudes regarding 
sexual ity and sexual orientation have brought lesser known aspects of Title VII 
into use. In Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Association,361 the Minnesota 
State Court of Appeals held that religious institutions and organizations can 
prohibit lesbians from positions of employment.368 Title VII recognizes a 
min isterial exception, insulating a religious organization's employment decisions 
regarding its ministers from judicial scrutiny under Title VII. 369 While an existing 
state statute was the ultimate standard upon which Thorson's  claim was rejected, 
the case i l l ustrates how the ministerial exception in Title VII can be used to 
perpetuate discrimination against gays and lesbians.370 
CONCLUSION 
Same sex sexual harassment represents a new and contested frontier in sexual 
harassment law specifically and sexual discrimination law generally. While the 
courts recognize that same-sex conflicts are legitimate claims and will likely be 
on the rise in a more sexually aware society, they have yet to expand the 
protections of Title VII fully to include same sex sexual harassment. The circuit 
spl its on this issue, however, reveal that Title VII disparate treatment and sexual 
harassment jurisprudence continue to develop in a manner Congress likely did 
not anticipate in  1964. Ultimately Title VII must become an umbrella to protect 
against conflicts arising in the workplace at the intersection of identity, sex, and 
power. 
363. See Fedor, supra note 356, at 468-69. 
364. See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2001). cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 1 1 55 (2002); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 23 1 F.3d 1 080 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 995 
< 200 1 ). 
365. 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 200 1 ). 
366. Id. at 264. 
367. 687 N.W.2d 652 (2004). 
368. See Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass'n, 687 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
369. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (West, WESTLAW through P.L. 109-2). 
370. See Thorson, 687 N.W.2d 652. 
